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Researchers have primarily focused on the use of drones for military purposes. Yet, 
understanding how the use of drones influences domestic policymaking from the 
perspective of mass and elite opinion was generally absent from the academic literature. 
The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore and describe the perceptions of 
policy elites and the mass public on the impact of drone use on domestic policy. Guided 
by Donohue, Tichenor and Olien’s theories of media framing and salience, mass opinion 
was measured through a convenience sample via the Walden Participant Pool, whereas 
elite opinion was measured through a purposive sampling design that targeted policy 
elites that are expects on drone policy, including academics and individuals working for 
the RAND Corporation, American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, and the Department of Defense. Sampling produced 108 respondents 
from the Participant Pool and 5 respondents from the elite survey. Data was analyzed 
descriptively using SPSS. Results suggested congruence in mass and elite opinion, 
particularly on the negative impact of drone use on privacy. These findings help advance 
the academic literature, by providing guidelines on the impact of drone use on domestic 
policymaking, particularly in the realm of privacy. The small sample size limited the 
inferences that could be drawn from the results. The study will lead to positive social 
change, by providing information on the potential impact of drones on society during 
their widespread adoption. Such data can be used by policymakers to generate rules that 
properly balance the technological value of drones in society with those rights that make 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government began exponentially 
increasing its use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), remote piloted aircraft (RPA), 
or what are colloquially known as drones, for military purposes. From September 2001 to 
April 2012, the U.S. military enlarged its drone supply from 50 to 7,500 (Zenko, 2013). 
This increase in the use of drones continues today with the enhanced interest in drone 
usage for counterterrorism and other domestic governmental purposes. 
Many scholars have investigated the use of and effectiveness of drones for 
military purposes and as a counterterrorism measure (Hafez & Hatfield, 2006; Jaeger & 
Siddique, 2011; Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2009; Wilner, 2010). The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) had a shift in the policy regarding the domestic adoption and use 
of drone technology. As drone technology made its way state-side, the impacts of such 
technology on U.S. life has changed, especially in terms of the right to privacy. Hobbyists 
now use personal drones to fly over neighborhoods, and corporations currently use them 
to deliver packages or take pictures for mapping programs. However, government 
agencies use drones to survey neighborhoods, peak into offices, conduct surveillance on 
persons of interest, and many other functions that can impinge on the right to privacy; 
such events are already taking place on a limited basis. 
Although some studies have gauged public opinion towards the use of drones for 
military purposes (Bowman & Rugg, 2011; Brown & Newport, 2013; Pew Research 
Center, 2013; Rasmussen Reports, 2013), little academic research has been undertaken to 
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understand the scope of these implications or public attitudes and opinions towards the 
adoption of such polices that will impact their lives. The purpose of this descriptive study 
was to explore and describe the perceptions of policy elites and the mass public on the 
impact of drone use on domestic policy.  
This chapter consists of several sections, where I provided information to justify 
the value of the study and place it in the context of the academic literature. First, the 
background section provides an overview of my literature review, as well as the gap my 
research closed, in addition to why my study was needed. Second, I address my problem 
statement, which discusses my research problem. I then move to the purpose of my study 
to identify what the problem was and what I focused on. Fourth, I focus on my research 
questions and hypotheses. Fifth, I address my theoretical framework, as well as how it 
relates to my research questions. Sixth, the nature of the study and the key variables are 
described, the research design, data collection, and data analysis. Seventh, I provide 
definitions of terms that the reader may not know, as well as my independent and 
dependent variables. Eighth, I delineate my research assumptions. Ninth, I examine the 
scope and delimitations the threats to the external and internal validity. Tenth, I discuss 
the limitations of my study, and then the significance my study may provide to this 
discipline, and I provide an overall summary of this chapter.    
Background 
 Many scholars have examined drones in the context of military usage (Hafez & 
Hatfield, 2006; Jaeger & Siddique, 2011; Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2009; Mannes, 2008; 
Price, 2012; Smith & Walsh, 2013; Wilner, 2010). For example, Mannes (2008) 
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investigated the effectiveness of drone warfare as a counterterrorism measure, by 
examining terror databases to determine if drone strikes successfully depleted terrorists 
from conducting retaliatory attacks. Additionally, Rasdan and Murphy (2009), McKelvey 
(2011), Dreyfuss (2011), Farley (2012), and Funk (2013) analyzed the constitutionality of 
the use of drone strikes on U.S. citizens abroad without due process. 
Problem Statement 
As the FAA has implemented new rules for drone policy, it was unknown how 
policy elites and the mass public perceived the impact of drone use on domestic policy. It 
was important to address this issue for several reasons. First, the public needed to 
understand how privacy was dealt with in the new regulations. Second, the public needed 
to understand what punishments and penalties awaited owners of drones if they violated 
these policies. Third, the public needed to determine how law enforcement could use 
drones as surveillance tools, as well as their limitations. In 2012, Congress passed the 
comprehensive FAA Modernization and Reform Act (FMRA). The Reform Act funded 
the FAA from 2012 to 2015 and provided for, among other things, airport improvement, 
next generation facial recognition software, and regulations on domestic drones (Olsen, 
2017). As dictated in the FAA Reform Act, Part 107 exempted recreational drones from 
regulation; however, it placed restrictions upon civilian drones (Olsen, 2017). 
Furthermore, drones could transport cargo for hire, but the combined weight of the drone 
and payload may not exceed 55 pounds, as well as interstate drone commerce being 
prohibited (Olsen, 2017). 
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The regulations prohibited commercial drone operation across state lines; drones 
may only be operated during daylight and may not fly out of visual range of the remote 
pilot (Olsen, 2017). In addition, they may not fly faster than 100 miles per hour, they 
could operate above an altitude of 400, and they cannot fly near airports or over 
populated areas (Olsen, 2017). However, the FAA failed to address the right to privacy 
(Olsen, 2017). Considering the cameras that drones could carry, privacy should have 
been addressed along with the safety issues (Olsen, 2017). Researchers have primarily 
focused on the use of drones for military purposes, while polling houses have gauged 
public opinion towards drone usage for those same purposes. Yet, understanding how the 
domestic use of drones influences domestic policymaking, as well as how the public felt 
about these effects, were generally absent from the academic literature 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore and describe the perceptions 
of policy elites and the mass public on the impact of drone use on domestic policy. I used 
a convenience sampling strategy to survey the mass public via the Walden Participant 
Pool. Elites were surveyed with a purposive sampling design by identifying scholars, 
members from the Department of Defense (DoD), the FAA, ACLU, RAND Corporation, 
legislative attorneys, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to ask questions about drones. 
In addition, they were offered an opportunity to explain their positions further. Pursuing 
this avenue helped to understand the public perceptions and concerns of drones (Clothier, 
Greer, Greer, & Mehta, 2015). Public perception was a driving factor in the acceptance of 
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drones and in setting safety objectives for safety regulations, as well as privacy concerns, 
to properly characterize what the public felt about drone use (Clothier et al., 2015). 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1. What level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do 
policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States? 
Research Question 2. How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on 
domestic policy in the United States? 
Research Question 3. How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use 
on domestic policy in the United States? 
The above research questions assisted me in examining how two different groups 
of people with varying levels of education, race, age, gender, religion, and political 
ideology viewed drone use within the United States. In addition, I determined if targeted 
elites and the mass public shared the same opinions of drones while being administered 
two separate surveys. 
Understanding political knowledge and opinion was essential for several reasons. 
First, political knowledge determined how much an individual paid attention to the news 
stories around them as well as how that influenced his or her decision (ie., if a person 
lacked political knowledge, then he or she was depriving themselves of information that 
could influence his or her opinion negatively because he or she did not have all the 
information necessary to make an informed decision;  (Somin, 2013).  Second, public 
opinion was important because it was a way to hold people in power accountable. If 
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drone policy was unpopular, then it was possible, through public opinion, to rewrite 
policy to better serve the public concerns (Somin, 2013). 
Theoretical Framework 
Targeted elites and the mass public may have felt differently about drones based 
on media framing and salience. The participants in the survey had varying attitudes that 
could have affected the way they felt about drones. For example, educational level may 
have created differences between the responses of the two groups. A scholar who 
authored peer-reviewed articles on drones might have more knowledge than someone in 
the mass public who did not.  The research questions were designed to determine which 
answers to the survey the targeted elites and the mass public answered similarly despite 
the varying levels of knowledge on the subject, as well as the outside influences of the 
media, family, and friends. I was able to separate outside and personal influences to 
arrive at the appropriate responses objectively. I used a theoretical framework involving 
salience, political knowledge, and framing effects to determine what influences affected 
respondents’ attitudes and opinions. 
The salience of an issue assists in determining why public opinion shifts from 
issue to issue (Manza, & Cook, 2002).  Salience defines the importance of certain issues; 
therefore, it was an essential element, because the lower the salience of certain issues 
were, the more politicians had the ability to maneuver more highly salient issues (Manza, 
& Cook, 2002). The more visible, prominent, and contentious a highly salient issue was, 
the higher the stakes were for why an individual felt the way he or she did. 
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Democracy within any entity requires the opinions of its people to play a role in 
determining policy outcomes, varying from domestic issues to foreign policy (Baum & 
Potter, 2008). However, scholarly literature on public opinion has yet to reach an 
agreement pertaining to what the citizens thought about U.S. policy on several issues, as 
well as how the public came to hold those opinions (Baum & Potter, 2008).  In addition, 
scholars also debated whether public opinion does or should influence U.S. policy (Baum 
& Potter, 2008). Scholars debated how much influence public opinion has on public 
policy, but all agreed that, in a democratic society, opinions from the public should affect 
governmental policy (Baum & Potter, 2008).  Scholars did not know how strong of an 
effect public opinion had on the democratic decision-making process (Baum & Potter, 
2008). Scholars agreed that public opinion mattered. 
Erickson, Wright, and McIver, (1993) concluded that there was a significant 
correlation between public opinion and policy, while Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson, 
(1995); Burstein, (2003); Wlezien, (2004); Soroka and Lim, (2003); and Soroka and 
Wlezien, (2005) also found that public opinion affected policy. In addition, Brooks and 
Manza, (2007) discovered that public opinion correlated with politicians putting forth 
proposals that could raise or lower taxes. However, to improve the scholars’ estimations 
involving public opinion’s influence on public policy, researchers needed to examine 
more issues that provided a proper assessment on how measurement decisions affected 
their conclusions, as well as including financial forces that may be stronger than public 
opinion (Burstein, 2009). Researchers found that investigating broad issues could force 
them to alter how they measured how the democratic process worked (Burstein, 2009). In 
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addition, scholars may also discover some measurement decisions that may 
underestimate how opinion influences policy, as well as discovering that lobbying and 
interest groups may manipulate the opinions of the public on policy (Burstein, 2009). 
Researchers often speculated how engaged the public was about politics and 
policy, as well as the level of information needed for an individual to express his or her 
policy preferences in a meaningful way, and the extent to which the media manipulated 
the information on policy issues (Burstein, 2009). Most citizens tended to know little 
about certain policy issues (Burstein, 2009).  The public may seem ignorant regarding 
certain policy issues, but when the time came to make a decision, they could make 
complicated decisions about governmental policies (Arceneaux, 2005). In addition, 
citizens did not need to know all available facts to make a sensible decision based on 
their beliefs; they could solve, understand, and learn about complex policies to make an 
informed judgment (Brooks, 2006). However, the question remained where the 
information to make informed decisions on public policy came from. 
First, people tend to acquire their knowledge about various topics through 
exposure (Visser, Holbrook, & Krosnick, 2008). Once an individual encounters a 
particular political issue, then he or she must conduct several steps. He or she must: 
devote significant time to it to have it remain in their working memory, actively process 
the information as it related to his or her private life; then, he or she links the issue with 
other information he or she acquired in order to formulate an opinion about an issue 
(Visser, et al., 2008). Prior knowledge of an issue increases the individual’s intelligence 
about an issue, which makes him or her more informative than most when it comes to 
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public opinion (Visser, et al., 2008).  The importance of how the media covered or 
framed an issue matters in structuring the message people receive, in addition to the 
amount of time or weight assigned to it (salience) and what the public thought about in 
terms of policy issues. These theories of salience and framing guided my predictions 
about why the public and elites possessed certain attitudes and opinions about drones. 
Nature of the Study 
This descriptive study included a convenience survey of the mass public 
measured by frequency and a purposive survey of policy elites with expert knowledge on 
drones. The survey for the mass public consisted of 32 multiple choice questions that 
began with asking about their level of political knowledge by asking them to identify two 
political figures. The survey then began to determine where they got their news from 
(Internet, print media, TV) and that was when the questions about drones, U.S. drone 
policy, and privacy took over the crux of survey. Finally, demographics questions about 
the make-up of the participants were identified and explained. The survey was placed in 
the Walden participant pool where students could easily access it. The data were 
collected by frequency analysis with SPSS to determine how the participants answered 
the questions. 
Using this type of random surveying has some positive and negatives. The 
positives included the convenience of having the survey sit in the participant pool, where 
I did not have to motivate potential participants to take the survey; they did it only if it 
interested them. Second, it was anonymous, so the respondent did not have to worry 
about being identified. I used SurevyMonkey.com for the targeted elite survey. My 
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survey involved a Likert scale, multiple-choice type of format for me to provide 
descriptive statistics about how my participants correlated to one another. A Likert-scale 
was appropriate because it allowed my participants to answer questions about drones 
from choices that ranged from strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, 
and strongly disagree (Adelson & McCoach, 2010). Additionally, the responses from my 
participants allowed me to quantify their answers and subject them to mathematical 
analysis, which allowed me to account for any undecided respondents (see Adelson & 
McCoach, 2010). The reliability of a Likert scale increased with the more multiple survey 
selections I had, which decreased any measurement errors; therefore, the more questions I 
provided about drones on my survey, the respondents’ answers would mitigate errors and 
bias, thus making the data from my survey valid (see Camparo & Comparo, 2013).  
Second, using a Likert scale showed a balance of positive and negative answers from the 
participants, thus enhancing reliability (Camparo & Comparo, 2013). Last, my survey 
included some open-ended questions designed to gauge the reasoning from elites on why 
they felt the way they did about U.S. drone domestic policy and its consequences. 
The negatives for this approach included an enormous number of experts not 
responding. Only five responded out of 53 targeted elites, which decreased the 
comparisons I could make with the participant pool. There were many possible reasons 
for the lack of responses. First, the experts I targeted may not have liked to take surveys. 
Second, there was no incentive for them to take the survey. Third, they did not have the 
time to take the survey. Lastly, they simply did not want to make the time to take the 
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survey. However, the information I received from the data helped me to answer my 
research questions. 
I asked both groups about state and federal policy on drones as well as their 
political and personal implications. In addition, I asked the targeted elites and the mass 
public about their perceived impact of drones on U.S. domestic policy. Therefore, those 
responses gave me data to the research questions because they were presented within the 
surveys. 
Definitions 
Counterterrorism: Twofold policy that dealt with proactive measures that 
included destroying terrorist training camps or strongholds and defensive actions that 
involved hardening targets, as well as augmenting surveillance (Sandler, 2009).        
Drones: Unmanned aerial vehicles that were controlled by pilots on the ground 
that consisted of reconnaissance and surveillance purposes, as well as those armed with 
missiles (Holmqvist, 2013).   
Drone warfare: The United States used drones to fire missiles in other countries 
to kill terrorists (Holmqvist, 2013). 
Elite opinion: People who possessed advanced knowledge about drones through 
research, operationally, civil liberty organizations, and constitutional experts (Darmofal, 
2005). 
Mass public: Individuals who did not have advanced knowledge on drones or may 
not have noticed stories about drones (Gabel & Scheve, 2007). 
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Terrorism: The premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or 
subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a 
large audience beyond that of the immediate victims (Enders & Sandler, 2012, p. 3). 
Assumptions 
First, I assumed the participants answered my survey questions honestly, because 
anonymity and confidentiality protected them, in addition to them volunteering, which 
gave them the option of withdrawing without any ramifications (see Frankfort-Nachmias, 
& Nachmias, 2008). Second, I assumed that frequency measured the positive or negative 
feelings of the participant’s accurately at the one moment in time I surveyed them in 
order for me to determine how their answers related among elite and mass opinion. Third, 
I assumed that individual observations were mutually independent or the value of one 
observation must not influence the value of other observations. Fourth, if errors existed in 
my study, I assumed they were random and were normally distributed (see Frankfort-
Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008).  Last, I assumed that the within-group random errors 
were homogeneous across all participants (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). 
Scope and Delimitations 
Threats to internal validity included replicating my study by others, because 
replication and cross-validation of my theory under different conditions, as well as 
various times, was the only way to confirm my work with any confidence (Frankfort-
Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). A second threat to internal validity involved maturation, 
where an individual’s feelings about drones may change depending on when I asked the 
participant. A third threat involved my survey taking so long that the participants may 
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just circle any answer in order to finish quickly.  A fourth threat involved participants 
who did not finish the survey, which could deplete my overall sample size and mitigate 
my data outcome. Last, I choose the right instrumentation that provided valid and reliable 
data.  
Several external threats to validity could have hurt my study. First, timing was a 
threat because if an unfortunate terror attack occurred prior to me administering my 
survey, this could severely affect my data due to a significant change in my participants’ 
attitude about drones protecting this country. Second, individuals may have allowed their 
political bias to dictate their feelings about drones, as well as their dislike of the 
government as a whole. Third, the elite survey was purposive, and the mass survey was 
convenience. 
Significance 
The significance of the social change aspect of my dissertation involved not only 
analyzing what Americans thought about U.S. drone policy and drones themselves, but 
also why they tended to think this way. In addition, I analyzed targeted scholars, military 
officials, and civil liberty organizations for them to provide their expert opinion, and then 
I conducted a cross-sectional analysis. I then compared expert opinion to mass public 
opinion to identify correlations, as well as contradictions on how they viewed drones. I 
analyzed the opinions of people who followed drone policy intently as opposed to those 
who did not.  I used surveys to acquire expert opinion, which was a departure from 
typical polls conducted by using mainly cell phone and in-person interviews to gather 
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public opinion. My dissertation provided policymakers the device to make clearer 
decisions, based on the feelings and attitudes of the mass public, as well as policy elites. 
Summary 
This chapter consisted of an introduction to the study, including the problem 
statement, the background of the problem, and the significance of the study, as well as 
definitions, assumptions, and limitations. The discussion also included the potential 
social change aspect of this study. Terrorism experts, government personnel, scholars, 
and the mass public analyzed this debate to determine the effectiveness of U.S. drone 
policy. 
In Chapter 2, I present reviews of the available literature about the details of 
current U.S. drone policy. In addition, this chapter includes the examination of the 
constitutionality of drones, such as due process in killing U.S.-born terror leaders, privacy 
rights, and surveillance over the United States. Additionally, I outline the polls that 
examined the attitude of participants towards drones, as well as the media’s influence on 
public opinion, the impact of public opinion, and the sway of elite opinion on the general 









Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees Americans a general 
right to privacy. One of the greatest technological advances that shaped the understanding 
of this right was the rapid technological advancement and imminent implementation of 
domestic drone use for a variety of governmental and private purposes. The implications 
of this technology for civil liberties were vast. Yet, the discussion and study of these 
implications, including those related to public and elite opinion regarding drone use, was 
abundant throughout the current literature. 
The FAA developed rules for domestic drone use (Olsen, 2017). Advancements in 
technology have rendered drones smaller, more versatile, quieter, cheaper, and able to 
escape notice (Stanley & Crump, 2011). This technology has become more inexpensive; 
therefore, law enforcement, federal agencies, and private companies have opportunities to 
mount advanced electronic systems that has further affected the privacy of people in the 
United States (Olsen, 2017). Drones possess high-powered lenses that are capable of 
zooming in on a person at high elevations, as well as using enhanced photos with high-
resolution, night vision, infrared, and ultraviolet imaging (Stanley & Crump, 2011). New 
technology allows drones to use radar that sees through ceilings and walls, as well as 
possessing video analytics, which allows a drone to track and recognize people through 
facial recognition technology (Stanley & Crump, 2011). Additionally, it could also 
identify movements and patterns of people to determine if any behaviors are out of the 
ordinary around high value targets (Stanley & Crump, 2011). As these technologies 
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found their way into government and private use throughout the years, the consequences 
for privacy was immense. 
The literature on drone use and its implications for public opinion drew from a 
variety of disciplines. In the following sections, I define my research strategy and discuss 
the evolution of drone use for military purposes overseas. Then, I review the extant 
literature and polls on public opinion related to drone strikes abroad and generally. This 
overview leads into the literature on civil liberties and drone strikes and the implications 
for domestic surveillance over U.S. airspace in regard to privacy issues. Finally, I 
examine the literature on public opinion as it pertains to gauging and predicting elite and 
public opinion on issues, followed by the implications for my research. 
Search Strategy 
I began the literature review search by identifying databases that would assist me 
in finding scholarly articles; therefore, I started with the Walden University Library. I 
used the Military and Government collection, the Homeland Security Digital Library, the 
International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, ProQuest, and SAGE 
Premier to search for drone warfare and surveillance. However, I did not limit my search 
to Walden’s library; I also used Google Scholar, Scribd, and JSTOR. All databases 
overlapped to some extent, but it was necessary to examine as many databases as possible 
to find the relevant and current articles to include in my literature review. For me to use 
these databases properly, I employed a Boolean search strategy. This strategy allowed me 
to merge phrases and words using AND, OR, NOT, and NEAR in order to widen, define, 
or limit my search. I did not limit my search to drones. The essential aspect of my 
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research involved comparing elite and mass opinions, and I needed to conduct an 
exhaustive search on public opinion as well. 
First, I began by finding polls on the Internet about drones conducted by U.S. 
polling entities (Pew, Rasmussen, Gallup, etc.) to establish what type of questioning was 
used prior to my research. Second, I used the Walden Library database to find articles 
about deliberative democracy, salience, public opinion’s influence on policy, as well as 
influences on public opinion. I limited my search to peer-reviewed articles to ensure 
nonbiased research. Third, I used Walden’s database to identify any dissertations, as well 
as the previously mentioned databases, to confirm that there were no scholarly articles 
that involved comparing elite and mass opinion with respect to drones. I also made sure 
my search parameters remained within 10 years to focus on recent material. Last, I 
investigated if any scholarly articles used a descriptive study that relied on a convenience 
survey of the mass public and a purposive survey of policy elites with expert knowledge 
on drones analyzed with frequencies. 
The Evolution of Drone Use 
Due to the increased effects of globalization, terrorism, transnational crime, 
border security, and the traditional facets of public safety, increased emphasis has been 
placed on how the military and law enforcement mitigated these security threats (Bloss, 
2009; Cottam & Marenin, 2005).  Increasingly drones have been touted as a 
technological solution to many of these security issues, as well as many commercial and 
private applications. In the following sections, I trace the history of drone use, which 
began with their development for military and counterterrorism measures, followed by 
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their development for law enforcement, regulatory, and commercial purposes. I end with 
a discussion of the literature on public opinion on drone use, and how it relates to the 
development of political knowledge and attitudes. 
The Use of Drones for Foreign Policy 
The development of drones on a wide scale evolved first for military purposes, 
and then became an integral part of the U.S. counterterrorism policy. The United States 
developed its policy on drone strikes after the passage of the Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force in 2001 by Congress (Foust & Boyle, 2012). Technological advancements 
allowed the United States to survey terrorists in real-time video to target them accurately, 
which was an advantage for the United States versus traditional military tactics (Gregory, 
2011).  The United States successfully targeted and eliminated high-profile al-Qaeda 
leaders like Nadir Haider Nasser al Shaddadi, Baitullah Mehsud, and Abdel Rehman al-
Hussainan in this manner (Foust, 2013). Targeted killing involves an extra judicial, 
premeditated killing by a country of an individual, where the country cannot detain him 
or her (McKelvey, 2011). The CIA conducted the majority of U.S. targeted killings using 
missile strikes from Predator drones (McKelvey, 2011). Drone strikes have now become 
an integral part of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and have increased exponentially 
during the Obama Administration (McKelvey, 2011). The U.S. drone policy continued to 
stir debate internationally, due to the lack of transparency and what constituted 
conducting a drone strike or not conducting one (Foust & Boyle, 2012). 
The literature on drone strikes for foreign policy purposes generally centers on its 
effectiveness as a counterterrorism measure and its use in targeted killings. Jaeger and 
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Siddique (2011) examined drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan to analyze if U.S. 
drone strikes mitigated al-Qaeda and Taliban retaliatory attacks. Jaeger and Siddique 
discovered that drone strikes effected retaliatory attacks in Pakistan, but not in 
Afghanistan. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) analyzed whether Israel’s targeted killings of 
Hamas and Hezbollah terror leaders influenced these groups’ violent retaliation from 
September 2000 through June 2004. Hafez and Hatfield determined that Israel’s targeted 
killings did not reduce the number of violent responses but increased them over the short 
or long term. Smith and Walsh (2013) examined Predator drone usage in the Middle East 
to determine if the strikes mitigated al-Qaeda’s aptitude to espouse their propaganda. 
Smith and Walsh did not provide any findings that showed a negative correlation 
between U.S. drone strikes and al-Qaeda’s capacity to disburse their propaganda. 
Johnston (2012) investigated whether leadership decapitation severely harmed or 
eliminated terror organizations and found that decapitating leaders by drones increased 
the probability for ending the war, increased the chances of victory for government 
forces, reduced violence from terror groups, and reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks 
if it was part of an integrated overall strategy against terror groups. 
Price (2012) discussed decapitating tactics as intent to interrupt the routine of 
terror organizations, as well as deterring anyone else from taking command of the group. 
Price advised that the following two conditions must be present for capitalization to 
work: if a group depended on a charismatic leader or if there was no clear line of 
succession for the organization. Jordan (2009) wanted to determine what conditions were 
necessary for decapitating a leader that resulted in the termination of a terrorist group and 
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if decapitation did not lead to collapse, then to what extent did it degrade or mitigate the 
group from conducting further terror attacks. Jordan discovered that organizational type, 
size, and age were essential in identifying the susceptibility of a terror group to 
decapitation. Mannes (2008) examined the effect of removing leaders of terrorist 
organizations in relation to their activity after removal, as well as comparing the various 
ways to remove a leader and the effects of removing multiple leaders from the same 
group. Mannes research found that removing depended on the size of the group, the 
smaller the group, the loss of its leader affected what the terror group from that point 
forward. Conversely, the larger the terror group was, losing their leader had little o no 
effect on their activities. Wilner (2010) suggested that eliminating leaders degraded the 
Taliban’s behavior, diminished the success rates of their retaliatory attacks, influenced 
their target selection, and diluted their morale. Targeted killings were effective 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency techniques, because they mitigated the counter-
capability of the Taliban. Johnston and Sarbahi (2013) concurred with Wilner about the 
effectiveness of drone strikes after they examined the effects they had on terrorism in 
Pakistan. 
The U.S. government has argued that using drones for the targeted killing of U.S. 
citizens living abroad is constitutional.  In September 2011, President Obama gave 
permission to the CIA to use a drone equipped with a Hellfire missile to kill Anwar al-
Awlaki, an American citizen (McKelvey, 2011). The DOJ claimed that Awlaki was a 
senior leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and that he represented an imminent 
threat to national security (McKelvey, 2011). Although Awlaki evaded capture by hiding 
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in Yemen, the U.S. Supreme Court found the Fifth Amendment still protected him 
(McKelvey, 2011). Some scholars have concluded that if the government properly 
balances the interests of a U.S. citizen’s life against the threat he or she poses to other 
U.S. citizens, then the government could kill him or her in this manner (Dreyfuss, 2011; 
Farley, 2012; Funk, 2013). Others have argued that such drone strikes should adhere to at 
least limited judicial review (Rasdan & Murphy, 2009).  This argument would be in line 
with previous Supreme Court cases supporting due process rights for suspected terrorists, 
such as Bourmediene v. Bush and cases, such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that helped to 
establish the legal foundations for drone strikes against U.S. citizens. As the United 
States has continually pushed the boundaries of drones for foreign policy purposes, such 
as counterterrorism, the technology has begun making its way state-side for uses in law 
enforcement, regulatory policy, and commercial applications. 
The Use of Drones for Domestic Policy 
On February 14, 2012, President Obama signed the FMRA of 2012 into law, 
which made aerial surveillance capabilities available to police departments and federal 
agencies (Gogarty & Hagger, 2011). The FMRA required that the FAA develop and 
implement a plan that created room for drones to fly over U.S. airspace by September 30, 
2015 (Gogarty & Hagger, 2011). The federal government has used drones since 2004; 
however, pending rule changes did allow commercial, private, and military drones to fly 
over U.S. airspace. The FAA predicted that as many as 30,000 drones would operate over 
the United States by 2030 (Schniederman, 2012). The FAA did not mention privacy, as 
well as what made a drone safe for operation within the United States throughout the 
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entire application process (Schniederman, 2012). As of right now, no law requires a 
warrant for conducting aerial surveillance above commercial or private property, if the 
aircraft operated within FAA regulations (Gogarty & Hagger, 2011). The writers of the 
Constitution could not have imagined the creation of drones; therefore, not much case 
law was available to challenge warrantless aerial surveillance (Gogarty & Hagger, 2011). 
A variety of court cases have already developed the basic structure for using 
drones for domestic purposes. In California v. Ciraolo, an anonymous tip about someone 
growing marijuana on his property caused the police to use aerial surveillance without a 
warrant, in order to overcome the large fence that surrounded the property. The police 
acquired a small private plane and flew 1,000 feet above his home, where they identified 
marijuana plants, and took pictures of the plants (Villasenor, 2013). The defendant 
claimed that the police violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches, as the police failed to get a warrant prior to flying over his home while taking 
pictures.  The Court disagreed by stating that it was unreasonable for the defendant to 
expect his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from observation by an 
individual from an altitude of 1,000 feet; at that altitude, the Fourth Amendment did not 
require the police to obtain a warrant to see the marijuana with their naked eye. That 
decision from the court’s ruling, suggested that the government could use drones to 
collect information without a warrant, while flying in public airspace, and obtaining data 
that was visible to the naked eye. This court case was not the only decision that paved the 
way for the government to use drones over the U.S. airspace. 
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In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the EPA wanted to make a second 
inspection of Dow’s site, but when the company refused, the EPA did not get a warrant.  
Instead, they hired a commercial pilot and aerial photographer to fly over the site at 
12,000, 3,000 and 1,200 feet, while taking pictures (Villasenor, 2013). The Court ruled 
that taking aerial photographs from above or near a site did not violate Fourth 
Amendment protections (Villasenor, 2013). This decision allowed the government to take 
photographs without a warrant, if the object was seen in legally navigable airspace. 
However, the courts did not specify which cameras, because drones can possess high-
powered lenses, night vision, infrared, and ultraviolet cameras. The government could 
also equip drones with see-through radar, which allowed them to see through walls and 
ceilings. 
In Kyllo v. United States, an agent with the Department of the Interior thought a 
suspect was growing marijuana inside his home.  The agent knew the suspect needed 
thermal lamps to grow marijuana indoors; therefore, he acquired a thermal imager to look 
into the suspect’s home, where he discovered the thermal lamps (Villasenor, 2013). The 
Court determined that thermal imaging was within the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment, but because the agent did not get a warrant, none of the evidence obtained 
by the agent was admissible. The Court found that the use of technology not generally 
used by the public to gain information within someone’s home that could not be obtained 
without going inside the home was inadmissible in court without a warrant (Villasenor, 
2013). The evolution of drone use will come rapidly in the United States. Currently the 
U.S. government has a demand to assist in protecting its 12, 380 miles of coastline, as 
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well as its numerous urban cities in order to mitigate crime (Vance, 2008). Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) was the first agency to use drones for surveillance purposes 
domestically (Dunlap, 2009) 
In 2005, CBP used Predator B drones in Arizona to monitor and secure the border 
with Mexico with the promise to increase their drone production to 24 by 2016 (Cottam 
& Marenin, 2005). These drones flew 3 miles in the air while relaying images from 
infrared cameras attached to their nose to a ground control station (Dunlap, 2009). If 
illegal immigrants or drug smugglers triggered a seismic sensor on the ground, the 
Predator could investigate and illuminate them with a laser, as well as, provide GPS 
coordinates to agents patrolling on the ground (Dunlap, 2009). For example, on January 
11, 2008, the Predator observed an illegal border crossing with a pick-up truck, and the 
drone operator notified agents, who subsequently used a tire deflation system to disable 
the truck, where they found over 1,000 pounds of marijuana (Dunlap, 2009). Another 
successful drone operation within the United States that resulted in an arrest occurred on 
a North Dakota farm in December 2011 (Farber, 2013). The Nelson County Sheriff's 
Department borrowed a drone from CBP to observe three sons of the owner of a 3,000-
acre farm involved in a standoff with police (Farber, 2013).  Because of the drone, the 
police ascertained that the brothers had no weapons and arrested them without firing a 
shot (Farber, 2013). 
The DoD operated drones targeting drug traffickers in order to acquire 
intelligence (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The FBI and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration have used Predators inside the United States without public knowledge or 
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debate (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The police department in rural Mesa County, Colorado 
won FAA permission in early 2011 to operate its Draganflyer drones anywhere in the 
country (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The FAA granted the Miami police department the 
permission to test two 18-pound Honeywell drones over the everglades at an altitude of 
400 feet (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The Houston police department secretly tested drones 
in 2007 and the Arlington police received help from drones to secure the Super Bowl in 
February 2011 (Stanley & Crump, 2011). In addition, the Texas Department of Public 
Safety used drones for police operations (Stanley & Crump, 2011). For instance, they 
operated a bird-sized “Wasp” drone for aerial surveillance when they executed a search 
warrant on private property resulting in an arrest (Stanley & Crump, 2011). 
In 2011, the city of Ogden, Utah wanted FAA permission to deploy an unmanned 
blimp for surveillance, as well as to prevent crime (Stanley & Crump, 2011). Hawaii had 
a plan under review to fly drones over its harbors for surveillance purposes (Stanley & 
Crump, 2011). Finally, National Guard units around the country also operated drones to 
train for their use overseas (Stanley & Crump, 2011). Train properly for overseas drone 
operations, Brigades in 30 states followed random vehicles on state roads to master their 
skills (Stanley & Crump, 2011). The nascent use of drones for law enforcement purposes 
already posed questions for privacy. Whether drones could successfully deploy over the 
United States without invading the privacy of its citizens was still an open question. 
Ohm (2012) wrote that drone technology grew at an unbelievable rate, which 
changed the way citizens lived their lives and the definition of “privacy” in general.  Ohm 
suggested that the term “power” should substitute for “privacy” about the Fourth 
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Amendment in order to limit it within police departments, as well as the federal 
government. Ohm argued that technology made the acquisition of information easier and 
cheaper. Therefore, he believed drones would eliminate a significant amount of privacy, 
because police did not need a warrant to fly a drone high above a public street to observe 
for criminal activity. 
Kerr (2011) agreed with Ohm about privacy issues when he expressed his concern 
for the capacity of drones to record video for long durations, which could lead to 
intrusive invasions from the government to gather information. Kerr argued that the 
courts must take charge of the situation to provide strict regulations. Currently, in prior 
aerial surveillance cases, the Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in spaces viewed from public navigable airspace. Kerr surmised 
that the courts cannot prohibit all forms of drone surveillance, but if they became too 
pervasive, the courts must equal the balance of power from tipping in favor of the police 
by new court rulings. Kerr argued that technology was advancing too quickly for the 
courts to regulate, unless the omnipresent use of drones became overbearing. Kerr 
concluded the FAA should wait before allowing the expansion of domestic drone 
surveillance, so the courts could determine whether they could place reasonable limits on 
the use of drones by police in order to identify a realistic balance between personal 
privacy and surveillance. 
U.S. Public Opinion on Drone Usage 
Scholars and professional polling houses have surveyed the mass public about 
attitudes towards drone strikes. In a 2001 Gallup/CNN/USA today poll, 77% of the 
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participants said they were willing to allow the assassination of terrorists.  In a 2001 
PSRA/Newsweek poll, 45% of respondents said it would be very effective. A Pew 
Research poll conducted in 2002 garnered responses that consisted of 36% participants 
saying US policy was very effective, 38% said it was somewhat effective, 15% said it 
was not too effective, and 8% said it was not effective at all.  In addition, they asked if 
the US policy of attacking potential enemies first, if the US thinks the probability was 
high for them to attack this country. The results consisted of 24% saying it was very 
effective policy, 39% said it was somewhat effective, 18% said it was not too effective, 
and 15% said it was not effective at all (Pew Research 2002). 
Brown and Newport (2013) conducted a Gallup survey in March, where they 
discovered that 65% of people in the U.S., supported drone attacks on terrorist suspects 
internationally. They discovered that 49% followed drone news very or somewhat 
closely, while 49% did not follow drone news closely or not at all.  The Pew Research 
Center (2013), conducted a survey February 7-10 that discovered continued support for 
drone strikes. 56% of Americans approved of drone strikes targeting extremists in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, while 26% disapproved.  Rasmussen (2013) conducted a 
national telephone survey on February 10-11, 2012 that found no matter the political 
persuasion, the majority of most voters’ supported drone warfare, where 88% of 
Republicans, 65% of Democrats, and 74% of Independents supported drone use. Motel 
(2013) found that 50% of Americans agreed that drones targeting extremists in Pakistan, 
Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan made the U.S. safer, while 14% disagreed, and 27% 
said drones make no difference. The participants’ political affiliations also were 
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significant, where 55% of Republicans and 49% of Democrats said the program has made 
the country safer.  The gender aspect consisted of 43% women doubting drones made the 
US safer, while 57% of the men said they did. Fox News (2013) conducted a poll on 
February 25-27, 2013 that discovered several consistent findings with other polls. First, 
they discovered 74% approved of drones strikes to kill suspected terrorists in foreign 
countries. Of that approval number, 69% were Democrats, 80% were Republicans, 73% 
were Independents, 78% were men, and 71% were women.  In addition, 76% were 
whites, 68% were non-whites, 76% had college degrees, and 73% did not. 
Gauging Media Influence on Public Opinion: Framing and Salience Effects 
Sometimes, people referred to the media as the fourth branch of the government, 
because it oversees governmental actions to keep the people informed (Donohue, 
Tichenor & Olien, 2006). In addition, if a democracy was to work, then the people must 
be able to participate in society; therefore, to do so properly, the public must rely on the 
objectivity of the media to provide detailed information (Donohue, et al, 2006). The 
media must honor the power they possess and portray issues without bias for the public to 
make informed decisions on whether to support a candidate or policy (Giles, 2004). The 
American media was a profit-based industry, where the importance of acquiring a story 
and reporting it first can trump accuracy, validity, and perspective of an issue (Payne, 
2005). Two theories in the literature referred to as framing and salience effects, helped to 
explain the influence of the media on public attitudes and opinions. 
Framing theory involves measuring the media’s influential power over how 
people understand issues, based on how the media depicted them (Delli Carpini, 2005). 
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Framing in the media occurred when reporters asserted the consequences and causes 
within the context of a narrative (Delli Carpini, 2005). The media could shape the 
opinions of the audience without telling them what to believe or think, but by presenting 
a narrative based on cues (Stone, 2002). For example, the media could favorably portray 
individuals who supported a certain policy as a hero, while portraying those who oppose 
a policy as a villain (Shanahan, McBeth, Hathaway, & Arnell, 2008).  Notably, these 
framing strategies replicated deeply held beliefs in policies that attempted to sway what a 
reader believes (Shanahan, et al, 2008). Framing effects did not interfere with the public 
having an enhanced role in setting the agenda, voicing their opinions on public affairs, as 
well as covering issues and events in a meaningful and useful way for citizens (Shanahan, 
et al, 2008). In addition, accepting the media as a member of the community, where they 
operated responsibly in identifying problems, as well as presenting solutions to these 
problems (Shanahan, et al, 2008). 
Two studies by Brewer (2006) and De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) 
emphasized the influence of framing effects on public opinion. Brewer (2006) 
investigated whether citizens could reasonably respond to information concerning 
national interests. Brewer analyzed the conditions needed for national stories of interest 
in the media to affect the opinions of the citizenry. First, the people must be exposed to a 
story that draws national attention and could embed itself within the memory of its 
viewers, which allowed the viewer to make a judgment on the issue. Second, individuals 
exposed to national issues could make it possible for the viewer to recall all the 
information on the issues to make an informed decision. Third, exposure to a national 
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story could cause the public to prioritize each national issue according to them. Brewer 
analyzed how citizens responded to their image of a foreign country in order to determine 
if that image conflicted or coincided with their reasoning about world affairs, as well as 
their opinions about foreign policy issues. Brewer discovered that when media coverage 
depicted a nation as in competition with US interests, participants held a less-favorable 
view of that nation; conversely, participants had a favorable view of nations who were 
depicted as wanting to share or contribute to assisting US interests. This study showed 
framing theory in practice and illustrated how framing effects by the media structured 
information in a way that directly influenced public attitudes towards an issue. 
De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) examined how much political sophistication 
an individual needed to possess to allow the media to influence their opinion.  TV, print 
media, and conversations about politics exposed individuals to subjective content that 
persuaded their attitude about an issue; therefore, both the mass media and personal 
communications among friends were essential elements of political information, which 
subsequently formulated and changed political attitudes. De Vreese and Boomgaarden 
investigated the conditions needed for how mass media and interpersonal 
communications affected public opinion, by identifying the level of political 
sophistication that mitigated cues in media messages. De Vreese and Boomgaarden 
discovered that for the news media to influence individual attitudes and policy beliefs, 
they only must conjure up a biased report that lacks another point of view, which would 
affect public opinion.  If the media exposed the public to both sides of an issue, then it 
was a two-sided information flow, which did not affect public opinion. Individuals who 
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were politically aware, tended to resist change no matter what new information the media 
provided, because they were more likely to have enough available information to process 
what any new debate brought in terms of deciding on a particular issue. The effects 
differed, depending on the amount of opposing opinions and if people already had the 
available information in their heads. People, who were moderately aware of politics, were 
susceptible to exposure of new information, while individuals who were the least aware 
of politics tended to absorb intense new information flows more easily. 
In addition to framing effects, research demonstrated that public opinion hinged 
on the salience or weight given to a policy issue in the mass media (Burstein, 2003). 
Regarding policymaking, public officials tended to address and consider public opinion 
to a greater degree when it was consistent, and an issue was highly salient (Burstein, 
2003). This gave rise to agenda setting, where the issues individuals discussed and 
thought about were influenced by what was placed before them in the mass media, as 
well as how much time was assigned to the issue. Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) 
discovered that a statistical significance existed where a president’s decisions could 
coalesce with public opinion. Canes-Wrone and Shotts surmised that if the president’s 
popularity was low and his agreement with a popular policy would increase his chance of 
reelection, he would endorse said policy. In addition, Canes-Wrone and Shotts discovered 
that policy congruence was 90% on salient issues such as crime, health, and social 
security, 71% congruence over liberal and conservative ideological issues, and only 32% 
congruence on foreign policy issues. Canes-Wrone and Shotts suggested presidents were 
more likely to take popular positions on issues, where a well-informed public voiced their 
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concern, whereas ignoring public opinion on those issues where the public was less 
informed. Additionally, they discovered that public opinion affected policy 75% of the 
time, as well as being substantially effective 33% of the time. Canes-Wrone and Shotts 
found that salience did affect public opinion’s influence on policy, despite interference 
from interest groups, political parties, and other political organizations. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Theories of framing and salience helped to explain how the media influenced 
public opinion. Regarding opinions on drone usage, it suggested themes emphasized by 
the media would predict public attitudes towards drones. The empirical literature 
supported the intervening effect of political sophistication in this equation to buttress the 
pure influence of media framing effects. How the public felt about domestic drone use 
should be influenced by how the media has portrayed these effects. My assumption in 
this regard was that policy elites had a higher level of political sophistication and 
diverged somewhat in opinions from the general public, which suggested that the level of 
political knowledge or sophistication influenced attitudes towards drones.  Salience 
theory suggested that the strongest and most pervasive themes emphasized by the media 
tended to have a stronger impact on public opinion towards drone use than those themes 
that were emphasized less frequently. 
Polling data mentioned previously provided some guidance to public attitudes 
towards drone use overseas and suggested breakdowns of opinions on the issue (Brown 
& Rugg, 2013; Motel, 2013; Pew research, 2013; Rasmussen, 2013). The amount of 
polling data on domestic use of drones for issues such as crime or border control was 
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more limited. Scholars did not know how elite opinion leans when it came to domestic 
drone surveillance, as well as how it compared to mass opinion; this was where my 
research filled that void. 
My study provided analysis on why there was a need to include elite opinion on 
salient issues in order to compare them to people who may not follow issues surrounding 
drones as closely as they did.  Previous research has not covered this aspect, but my study 
enhanced the discipline on several relevant fronts. First, how media framing effected how 
the mass public perceived the domestic use of drones. Second, it examined salience, or 
their knowledge of the phenomenon. Third, it examined the impact of political 
sophistication on attitudes and beliefs. Finally, my study determined the overall public 
feelings about the domestic use of drones and supplemented this data with elite surveys to 
determine the potential implications of drones in society. 
For a debate to occur on an issue, some people had a predetermination on how 
they felt, which in turn determined whether outside opinions persuaded their attitude on 
an issue. For example, a person’s overall attitude toward drones may have consisted of 
both negative and positive examinations of their use on several levels. An individual 
could have believed that drones would protect this country from terrorism, but were 
intrusive on privacy rights; therefore, that individual’s attitude toward drones depended 
on the relative magnitude of the weight assigned to each attribute (Chong & Druckman, 
2007). I targeted elite opinion as opposed to conducting a randomly selected group of 
participants that may or not have included them. 
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Elite opinion was considered expert analysis; thus, I analyzed if they came to the 
same conclusions as individuals who were not considered experts. The benefit of 
measuring the opinion of elite individuals who studied certain issues such as drones, 
helped them offer guidance, statistics, and information to people who were not as astute 
as others are on this issue (Hochschild, 2013). Once elites made their decision on a 
certain policy issue, the probability of the mass public adopting a positive or negative 
view on the same policy issue tended to increase (Hochschild, 2013). However, when 
elites did not agree based on ideological lines, there was an even flow of information, so 
the inattentive public drew on the cues of the elites (Hochschild, 2013). If the politically 
aware took their signals from elite opinion, then that information tended to persuade them 
in a way that aligned them along party lines (Hochschild, 2013).  My data suggested that 
if such elite agreement existed that may be instructive to suggest where public opinion 
may evolve overtime on this issue. 
My study further advanced why the mass public felt the way they do about 
drones. For example, did political knowledge of drones influence their feelings, or other 
factors, such as friends, family, expert opinion, or ideology?  People who paid attention 
to debate issues like drones tended to disagree with expert opinion when one, or both, of 
the political parties challenged this opinion, then when both parties concurred with this 
opinion (Darmofal, 2005). Citizen disagreement with expert opinion tended to coincide 
with those citizens having a predisposition towards a political party (Darmofal, 2005). 
The public who supported the political elites, who tended to agree with expert opinion on 
an issue, increased as they increased their level of expertise on a subject (Darmofal, 
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2005).  The public framed their opinion according to preexisting policy preferences, as 
well as life experiences that entered their reasoning as to forming judgments on policies 
(Darmofal, 2005). This created a bias on the individual’s part, because they may not be 
willing to allow for other viewpoints on an issue (Darmofal, 2005). Certainly, this was 
true for people personally affected by an issue, as opposed to those who were not 
(Darmofal, 2005). People affected by drones in some fashion would not listen to or make 
room for expert opinion on the benefits of drones for the U.S. This increased the 
worthwhile investment in investigating mass public attitude towards drones compared to 
expert opinion. 
The literature for drone strikes, framing, drone surveillance and public opinion on 
drones were conducted several years ago.  However, there has been recent updates to the 
literature that I found important to share here. For example, with reference to media 
framing and salience, Lee (2017) explored the intermedia agenda-setting relationships 
and frames in the high-choice media environment, found that media framing was 
determined by the outlet in which it was delivered. Lee found that late-night comedies 
mostly gathered news and information from traditional news media and re-packaged it, so 
they gave it a new interpretation, before they presented the easily digestible information 
to a different set of audiences (Lee, 2017). In addition, Allwright, (2018) studied media 
framing of refugees in the United States and Canada, found that the media framing in 
newspaper articles in Canada and the United States addressed the subject of refugees 
differently, whereas the newspapers in Canada projected a more positive tone and 
welcoming frame, than the more negative tone portrayed in articles in the United States, 
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thus Allwright concluded these opposite tones affected the attitudes of the readers in both 
countries. With respect to drone surveillance and strikes the literature discovered that the 
public was still uncomfortable with increased surveillance in the U.S. (Zaia,2018). 
Surveillance consciousness examining subjective understandings of mobile technology 
surveillance found that through exploring surveillance consciousness of mobile 
technology surveillance that people thought that current surveillance technologies came 
close to making the U.S. an oppressed state, whereas others were willing to accept certain 
types of surveillance as long as some conditions were met (Maida 2016). The roles of 
unmanned aircraft systems in civilian, law enforcement, and military environments 
opined that the continued growth of drones was inevitable in the realms of archaeological 
surveying, military surveillance and airstrikes, law enforcement, firefighting, farming, 
photography, and commercial delivery. However, what concerned Maida most was the 
possibility of low-cost drones available to anyone that could allow criminals and 
adversaries the ability to conduct malicious activity, in addition to hacking an armed 
drone in turn which could be unleashed within the U.S. (Maida, 2016; Hernandez, 2018). 
The effects of surveillance technology on society found that the people in federal and 
state agencies felt that individuals forfeited their rights to privacy the moment they 
stepped outside, whereas most of the public felt that despite being in public they were 
afforded some privacy. Literature that observed the opinion of the public through surveys 
about drones showed how relevant the issue was. 
Davis (2019) found that affective considerations seemed to play a much more 
significant role than previously thought because respondents who scored high on the 
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authority/respect dimension were much more likely to accept positive beliefs about drone 
strikes and reject negative beliefs. Whereas, those who scored high on the harm/care 
dimension were much more likely to accept negative beliefs and reject the idea that drone 
strikes were necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack (Davis, 2019). 
Shelby (2017) found that the public was more likely to support use because they thought 
that was riskless because it kept U.S. soldiers from danger, but the public also thought by 
increased accountability, leaders must carefully choose how they used drones. If leaders 
disregarded those risks, it could cost them, so they may think twice about using drones in 
a way that went against established norms (Shelby, 2017). 
My study was important because it included much of what the current literature 
discussed when it came to the public opinion and drone use involving strikes and privacy 
through increased use as well as improved technology. Also, how the media portrayed 
this issue affected the attitude of the people still today. In addition, my study investigated 
the opinions of targeted elites and the mass public; however, recent literature has not 
researched this type of comparison analysis; therefore, my study has advanced an avenue 
of approach which helped it fit nicely into the literature today. 
Chapter 3 describes the research method, data collection and analysis procedures, 
design of the study, and method of participant selection. The elite and mass opinion must 
be measured properly for me to accurately identify, analyze, and illustrate the 
significance that the data provided. The research method I chose must ensure that I could 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this descriptive study was to explore and describe the perceptions 
of policy elites and the mass public on the impact of drone use on domestic policy. This 
allowed me to analyze comparisons and contradictions between the two groups to 
determine if they drew the same conclusions about drone policy and if it invaded privacy. 
I conducted a frequency analysis on a convenience survey of the mass public and a 
purposive survey of policy elites with expert knowledge on drones, so I could 
comprehend the opinions of two distinct groups of individuals, so I determined if those 
opinions are the same. 
Research Question 1. What level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do 
policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States? 
Research Question 2. How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on 
domestic policy in the United States? 
Research Question 3. How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use 
on domestic policy in the United States? 
The above research questions assisted me in achieving the purpose of this study 
by examining how two different groups of people with varying levels of education, race, 
age, gender, religion, and political ideology view drone use within the United States. In 
addition, I determine if targeted elites and the mass public share the same opinions of 




I targeted elite opinion (Appendix C) by selecting several distinct individuals. 
First, all of the scholars I used in my literature review provided insight on drone warfare, 
because they researched, analyzed, made conclusions, and published their work on the 
subject. Second, I targeted the ACLU, because of their opposition to drones in general, 
and because they sued the Obama Administration on its targeted killings of U.S. citizens 
with drones without due process. In addition, two of their members wrote a paper staking 
the ACLU’s position on domestic drone use, as well as recommendations to minimize 
privacy and civil liberty concerns. Third, I targeted an Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, who drafted the memo that 
allowed the president to target U.S. citizen Anwar al-Alaki for a drone strike. Fourth, I 
targeted the Deputy Director of the Unmanned Warfare Strategic and Tactical Systems, 
because he was responsible for the U.S. drone program overseas. Fifth, I acquired the 
assistance of legislative attorneys, because they analyzed legal issues that Congress may 
encounter and recommend ways to mitigate them when writing laws for drone 
surveillance within the United States. 
Sixth, the RAND Corporation was contracted by all governmental entities to 
provide an objective look at U.S. policies and operations. This group of people examined 
the Air Force’s current use for their drones and possible uses for the future, as well as 
concerns for domestic use. In addition, they examined the dangers of armed UAVs 
gaining operational use among U.S. allies and enemies to determine their effect on U.S. 
security; therefore, they had to examine what drones were, what they were used for, and 
their effectiveness overall. Seventh, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association included 
40 
 
pilots who potentially shared the skies over the United States with drones; therefore, I 
was sure they had some concerns over their proposed altitudes. Eighth, the FAA was in 
charge of creating the rules, guidelines, and regulations for commercial and federal 
government drone use over U.S. airspace. Their expertise on monitoring these guidelines 
was essential to avoid aircraft and drone collisions over populated areas. Their opinion 
was needed to evaluate where they stood on drones overall, because they were tasked 
with overseeing them. Lastly, Common Unmanned Aircraft Systems Joint Program 
Office and Unmanned Aircraft System Executive Committee were two groups that 
involved joint efforts among the Customs and Border Patrol, Homeland Security, and 
NASA to determine drone policy in addition to drone operation. The survey included 
several open-ended questions as well as multiple-choice questions as shown in the second 
appendix. In order to acquire information on mass opinion, I used the Walden Participant 
Pool to generate a random sample and subject them to my survey listed in the first 
appendix. 
Questionnaire 
I used SurevyMonkey.com to assist me in creating my questionnaire that I used 
for my research. I used a precontact e-mail (Appendix G), an invitation e-mail (Appendix 
H), and a follow-up email (Appendix I) in case the targeted elites did not reply. My 
survey involved a Likert-scale, multiple-choice type of format for me to provide 
descriptive statistics about how my participants correlated to one another. A Likert-scale 
was appropriate because it allowed my participants to answer questions about drones 
from choices that ranged from strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, 
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and strongly disagree (Adelson & McCoach, 2010). Additionally, the responses from my 
participants allowed me to quantify their answers and subject them to mathematical 
analysis, which allowed me to account for any undecided respondents (see Adelson & 
McCoach, 2010). The reliability of a Likert-scale increased with the more multiple 
survey selections I had, which decreased any measurement errors; therefore, the more 
questions I provided about drones on my survey, the respondents’ answers mitigated 
errors and bias, thus making the data from my survey valid (see Camparo & Comparo, 
2013).  Second, using a Likert scale showed a balance of positive and negative answers 
from the participants; thus, its enhanced reliability (see Camparo & Comparo, 2013). 
Last, my survey included some open-ended questions designed to gauge the reasoning 
from elites on why they felt the way they did about U.S. drone domestic policy and its 
consequences. 
The Appropriate Number of Participants 
I used G*power to establish my appropriate sample size in addition to further 
pertinent dimensions. I used an F test that involved repeated measures, as well as an 
examination of interactions MANOVA statistical test, to determine an A priori power 
analysis. My results illustrated a medium effect size (.25), α err prob= .05, power (1-β err 
prob = .95; my categorical variables provided me some output parameters for my data. 
First, noncentrality parameter λ = 17.44, critical F = 2.64, df numerator = 3.0, df 
denominator = 275, sample size = 279, actual power = .95, and pillai V = .06. My 108 
participants in the Walden Participant pool and five targeted elites were smaller than 
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what the aforementioned power analysis showed in participation by the sampled 
individuals. 
Procedures 
I contacted the elite opinion by using Surveymonkey’s contact list for those who 
participated in polls, as well as how I previously stated. I hoped to contact them from an 
e-mail list, where I asked them to cooperate on my research on drones. I hoped that from 
their previous research on the subject, they would agree. I planned to administer the 
survey to them in three steps. First, I e-mailed my pre-contact letter (Appendix E) where I 
reminded them that the survey was on its way, as well as their right not to fill out the 
questionnaire in addition to how I would measure their responses against mass opinion. 
Second, I mailed the survey packet (Appendix F) about a week later for those targeted to 
fill out. Third, after I received respondents, I mailed a follow-up survey (Appendix G) for 
those who did not respond to acquire their cooperation. For me to acquire the 
participation from the Walden Participation pool, I completed the appropriate IRB and 
institutional procedures to gain access to that population. 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
All research is imperfect; therefore, there are issues that could arise that a 
researcher does not anticipate or cannot control when it came to garnering public opinion.  
For my dissertation, there were some assumptions that I needed to accept. First, I 
assumed that my participants would answer all of my survey questions honestly, because 
their responses were anonymous, confidential, and they could choose not to participate 
without any ramifications; therefore, they knew that I protected their privacy on all 
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fronts. Second, I assumed my cross-sectional design accurately measured the attitudes of 
the participants at a certain point in time. Third, I assumed that my observations were 
independent and objective in order not to influence the results of the data, as well as 
providing them to my dissertation committee to confirm my data. Fourth, if errors existed 
in my research, I assumed then they occurred randomly, as well as being distributed 
normally (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). Last, I assumed that the random 
errors that occurred within each group measurements were homogeneous across my 
entire sample size (see Frankfort-Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). When I conducted my 
research, I had to be cognizant of external and internal threats to validity. 
To confirm my work with any level of confidence, scholars must replicate and 
cross-validate my research under diverse circumstances, as well as an assortment of times 
to determine if what I discovered was consistent with other researchers (see Frankfort-
Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2008). Maturation was another internal threat to validity, 
because a participant may change his or her feelings about drones prior to me 
administering my survey. There was nothing that I can do about that except provide 
notation that this aspect was possible. Third, I must be cognizant that the attention span 
of people could diminish the longer a survey was; therefore, I had to make it take less 
than 15 minutes, so I would not lose their interest. Fourth, people who failed to answer all 
survey questions could mitigate my data output, because I would have to eliminate that 
survey response, which meant he or she would have answered less questions than the 
other participants did. Last, if I chose the incorrect instrumentation for measurement that 
could prevent my data from being valid and reliable. 
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However, I still must concern myself with several external threats to the validity 
of my research. First, the timing of my survey was important because currently there 
were numerous reports available involving domestic drones, as well as the continued use 
of drone strikes overseas. These could formulate a bias or reassure individuals of their 
previously held beliefs about drones. Second, political ideology could dictate a 
participant’s preconceived bias against drones, thus possibly hurting my data overall. I 
also had some limitations to my research that would not affect the feasibility of my 
research. 
I limited my theoretical perspective to consist of the salience of U.S. drone 
warfare policy and how it affected public opinion. Additionally, I limited my RQs to 
determining if participants felt drone surveillance over the United States alleviated their 
fear of terrorism or increased their fear of losing privacy. In addition, my research was 
limited, because I targeted members of the elite opinion, as well as the Walden 
Participant Pool, which excluded a plethora of potential participants. 
I wanted to determine how my participants answered my research questions to 
examine if any significant differences between elite opinion and public opinion from the 
Walden Participant Pool, by using frequency analysis in SPSS. I wanted to analyze 
whether the Walden participant pool and targeted elites differed on drones and their 
domestic capabilities no matter their level of knowledge on them. Therefore, their 
answers would develop from the media, as well as family and friends, which would differ 
from those who researched drones, operated them, opposed them based on the 
Constitution, and those who created this policy. My survey consisted of a Likert scale 
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with five subscale answers, which would measure the two group’s feelings about various 
questions about drones, as well as open-ended questions to the elites. In addition, I 
further measured their educational level, political affiliation, religious preference, age, 
gender, and ethnicity to further make comparisons about their attitude. 
Conclusion 
The Likert-scale survey questions provided multiple choice answers that made it 
possible to deliver an accurate account of the feelings of the participants about drones in 
general and U.S. drone policy with respect to privacy concerns. The 108 participants 
from the Walden participant pool was enough to get a variety of responses; however, five 
targeted elites was a small sample. In addition, the open-ended questions for the targeted 
elites were not answered as in-depth as I wanted. The data, however, did provide similar 
answers from the two groups and their surveys. 
In Chapter 4, I will present the results of the study. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The primary goal of the study was to examine how policy elites and the mass 
public perceived the impact of drone use on domestic policy. The first group involved the 
Walden participant pool, which consisted of non-experts on drone warfare. The Walden 
participant pool consisted of 108 respondents to a 32- question survey. The hope was to 
acquire a large enough sample size that represented the population in general to make 
valid comparisons. The second group was the targeted elites, which consisted of scholars 
who wrote peer-reviewed articles on drones, people from the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), DoD, DOJ, Legislative Attorneys, RAND Corporation, and the FAA 
The three primary research questions that the data addressed were 
1. Research Question 1. What level of political knowledge regarding drone 
usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States? 
2. Research Question 2. How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone 
use on domestic policy in the United States? 
3. Research Question 3. How does the mass public perceive the impact of 
drone use on domestic policy in the United States? 
The data helped me address RQ1 by showing that both groups possessed 
knowledge of drone usage overseas and within the United States. Just over half of the 
participants frequently looked at news reports regarding drones. Because my targeted 
elites were already well versed in drones, the political knowledge was encompassed in it. 
With only five participants from the policy elites, the sample size was too small gauge 
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wider opinion; however, the data did provide enough information to address RQ2 where 
all five respondents were concerned about drone impact domestic policy. None of the 
elites thought drone surveillance within the United States was not a valuable tool and 
should not be available for local, state, and federal law enforcement due to privacy 
concerns. Finally, I found that the mass public in RQ3 perceived drone impact on 
domestic policy as intrusive on privacy. I found that 64 of the108 respondents were either 
very or somewhat concerned. In addition, table showed the potential for governmental 
abuse of drone use within the United States, and 84 of the 108 participants were either 
very or somewhat concerned. 
Walden Participant Pool 
I received IRB approval to place my mass public survey on the Walden 
participant pool website on April 21st, 2015. I had to ask to keep it being viewed by the 
pool every 6 months; therefore, I renewed for another 6 months in August 2015, as well 
as January 2016.  My survey was deleted July 7th, 2016, because there were not any new 
participants for my survey in the previous 3 months; therefore, I decided that no more 
individuals would take the survey. 
Once the survey was completed in the Walden participant pool, I was able to see 
that my sample size consisted of 108 participants. The survey entailed of 32 questions, 
which was open to anyone who signed up for the participant pool the university sponsors. 
Once I received the data, I then imported the data into SPSS for analysis. The survey 
questions were analyzed separately by frequency, so I saw how each question was 
answered as well as the percentage of the participants answering those questions. Table 1 
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shows the breakdown of survey question number 32, which dealt with race. There was 
good representation of the population, which provided insights from various groups 
rather than one type of race dominating the entire survey. Of the 108 participants, five 
declined to answer, while 13 chose to prefer not to answer; therefore, 18 of the 108 
participants did not want to answer the question about race. The 18 who did not answer 
only represented 16.6% of the total participants. The remaining breakdown of the 
respondents consisted of 38 European Americans, 22 who chose other, 11 African 
Americans, eight Hispanic Americans, seven Asian -Americans, and three Muslims. The 
representation of the Walden participant pool was important because there were many 
racial viewpoints that were being assessed in this survey. However, it was important to 
point out that this sample was not meant to be representative of the population. 
 
This is an example of a table in APA style (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
 
Race/Ethnicity of The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
African 
American 
11 10,2 10.2 
Asian American 7 6.5 6.5 
European 
American 
38 35.2 35.2 
Hispanic 
American 
8 7.4 7.4 
Muslim 3 2.8 2.8 
Other 22 20.4 20.4 
Prefer not to 
answer 





5 4.6 4.6 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Walden Participant Pool. 
 
 Table 2 represents the gender breakdown of the survey; there were 79 female 
respondents compared to only 24 male respondents, as well as four who preferred not to 
answer. 
Table 2  
 
Gender of The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Female 79 73.1 73.1 
Male 24 22.2 22.2 
Prefer not to 
answer 
4 3.7 3.7 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 Table 3 showed the breakdown of religious preference from the participants. Of 
the 108 participants, four declined to answer the question at all and nine chose to prefer 
not to answer. The remaining breakdown was as follows: 15 identified their religious 
preference as Catholic, three as Islam, two as Jewish, 45 as other, and 29 as Protestant. 
The number of individuals who chose other, suggested to me that I needed to include 
more types of religion in to have a clearer assessment of who preferred what type of 
religion in order to determine how that affected their opinion on drones. 
Table 3 
Religion of The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Catholic 15 13.9 13.9 
Islam 3 2.8 2.8 
Jewish 2 1.9 1.9 
Other 45 41.7 41.7 
Protestant 29 26.9 26.9 
Prefer not to answer 9 8.3 8.3 
[Decline to Answer] 4 3.7 3.7 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool.  
To delve deeper into the demographics of the participants, they were also asked 
about their political ideology/ affiliation. Three declined to answer the question, which 
was an insignificant amount that would call into question the validity of the survey. 
However, 41 people identified themselves as Democrat, which suggested that most of the 
people in the survey used this ideology in their reasoning behind how they felt about 
drones. Twenty-nine people identified themselves as independent, which meant the 
second highest number of people in the survey had no political affiliation and might be 
open-minded when it came to drones. Twenty people identified themselves as 
Republicans, while 14 identified themselves as other. There was some overbalance to the 
respondents, which showed some representation of all political affiliations. 
Table 4 
 
Political Ideology of The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Democrat 41 38.0 38.0 
Independent 29 26.9 26.9 
Other 14 13.0 13.0 
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Republican 20 18.5 18.5 
[Decline to Answer] 3 2.8 2.8 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
    
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 Table 5 shows age representation, which was more balanced than any other of the 
demographic questions. Ages 25 through 64 had 98 of the 108 participants, which 
accounted for 90.7% of the respondents. There were two between the ages of 18-24 and 
six between the ages of 65-74, with one who preferred not to answer. This suggested that 
the majority of the participants had a college degree or was currently working on a 
graduate level degree. Table 6 confirmed this, because of the 108 participants, 98 listed a 
4-year college or graduate school as their highest level of education completed. This 
suggested that the participants were educated, thus possibly were knowledgeable about 
drones and their use. Although these individuals were not experts on drones, they 
accessed information about it and were in the very least aware of the US drone program 
and what it was currently being used for as well as its suggested future uses. 
 
Table 5 
Age Group of The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
18-24 2 1.9 1.9 
25-34 23 21.3 21.3 
35-44 27 25.0 25.0 
45-54 28 25.9 25.9 
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55-64 20 18.5 18.5 
65-74 6 5.6 5.6 
Prefer not to answer 1 .9 .9 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
Table 6 
Education of The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
2-Year College 4 3.7 3.7 
4-Year College 20 18.5 18.5 
Graduate School 78 72.2 72.2 
High School 3 2.8 2.8 
Law School 1 .9 .9 
[Decline to Answer] 1 .9 .9 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
      
Targeted Elites 
 The targeted elites, consisted of scholars who wrote peer-reviewed articles on 
drones, people from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), DoD, DOJ, Legislative 
Attorneys, RAND Corporation, and the FAA. The targeted elite survey had 18 multiple 
choice questions with six of those questions asking to elaborate on those answers in order 
to see why they felt the way they did at the time of the survey. 
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 After I received IRB approval on April 14th ,2015, I sent out a precontact 
notification (Appendix E) to the targeted elites with the help of surveymonkey.com on 
April 18th2015. This notification introduced myself and explained why I was asking 
them for their assistance. I then sent out an invitation e-mail (Appendix F) on April 27th, 
2015. This invitation explained the survey and what my dissertation was about, as well as 
my contact information along with my dissertation chair. In addition, this invitation had a 
link to the survey on it, which was distributed to 73 various individuals from the above 
groups. In addition, I sent out a permission form from SuveryMonkey.com (Appendix D), 
that I got their permission to use their website to send out the letters. When I was not 
getting many responses, I then sent out a follow-up e-mail (Appendix G) that reminded of 
the invitation e-mail and how I needed their help. This follow-up e-mail also had a link to 
the survey on it. I sent this e-mail on numerous occasions until April 28th, 2016, when it 
was apparent that I would not acquire anymore participants. Only five individuals 
responded to the survey. Although numerous attempts were made to acquire their 
expertise, 68 people decided not to participate in the survey. Because there were only five 
respondents, the comparisons to the Walden participant pool were limited. However, five 
people did provide some insight and it was important to include it. Of the five 
participants, no one answered the question about race. Four out of the five were male 
with only one female. All five completed graduate school, which helped explain why 
they were targeted elites, because of their level of education and work on drones. 
 When the survey asked about religious preference, one was Jewish, one was 
Protestant, two preferred not to answer, and one said other. When asked about their 
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political affiliation, one said Democrat, two skipped the question, and two said other. 
Lastly, the age breakdown was as follows. Two identified themselves between the ages of 
55-64, one between the ages of 45-54, one between 25-34, and one between 35-44. With 
the small sample size, there was not much to compare within the targeted elite group. The 
targeted elites were not representative of the population, because they dealt with drones; 
however, the information and the demographics would have been valuable if more 
individuals would have decided to participate. 
Table 7 
Targeted Elite Demographics  
 Race  Religion Politics Education Gender Age 
Elite 1 No Answer Jewish Democrat Graduate 
School 
Male  55-64 
Elite 2 No Answer Protestant No Answer Graduate 
School 
Male 55-64 
Elite 3  No Answer Other  No Answer Graduate 
School 
Male 45-54 
Elite 4 No Answer No Answer Other  Graduate 
School 
Male 25-34 
Elite 5 No Answer No Answer Other Graduate 
School 
Female 35-44 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
The Data 
The next few paragraphs include questions from the Walden participant pool 
survey only. The assumption was made that the participants did not know a lot about 
drones, and because of that lack of expertise, their political knowledge needed to be 
determined as well as where they obtained this information. This was necessary to 
discover how much attention they paid to politics and current events. The first question 




Level of Interest in National Politics by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
High 42 38.9 38.9 
Low 19 17.6 17.6 
Medium 43 39.8 39.8 
None 3 2.8 2.8 
   Total                             108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 Of the 108 participants, 85 of them said they had a high to medium interest in 
national politics, which meant that 78.7% of the participants were well-informed and had 
a significant understanding of what was happening politically across the country. These 
were the individuals who seemed to respond to the rest of the questions. Only 22 
participants had a low or no interest in national politics, while one did not answer the 
question at all. This accounted for only 21.3%, but by no means an indication not to 
expect the rest of the questions for the survey to be answered in a similar fashion.  The 
second and third questions dealt with correctly identifying well-known political members 
of congress as well as his or political affiliation in order to confirm question 1 and 
determine if indeed the people who said they had a high or medium level of interest in 
national politics, truly did. In addition, to determine if the participants who claimed to 
have little or no interest still had enough interest to identify Mitch McConnell (R) and 
Nancy Pelosi(D). 
Table 9: 
 Identify Politicians by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Charles Schumer; 
(D) 




84 77.8 77.8 
[Decline to Answer] 21 19.4 19.4 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 The second question that dealt with Mitch McConnell (R) had the following 
results; 84 of the 108 participants correctly identified him, which represented 77.8% of 
the pool. This was close to the 78.7% who said they had a high or medium interest in 
national politics. This confirmed that their interest and political knowledge was high. 21 
declined to answer and one did not put a response, which accounted for 20.3% of the 
participant pool. The third question dealt with Nancy Pelosi (D) and 67 of the 108 
correctly answered the question or 62%. However, 19 answered John Boehner, in 
addition, 18 declined to answer.  
Table 10. 
Identify Politicians by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
John Boehner; (R) 19 17.6 17.6 
Nancy Pelosi;( D) 67 62.0 62.0 
Tammy Duckworth; 
(D) 
3 2.8 2.8 
[Decline to Answer] 18 16.7 16.7 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
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Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 The fourth question asked the participants how closely have you been following 
news stories about the U.S. government’s use of drones? 
Table 11.  
Following News Stories About Drone Use by the Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Not at all 10 9.3 9.3 
Not too closely 37 34.3 34.3 
Somewhat closely 46 42.6 42.6 
Very closely 14 13.0 13.0 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 Most of the participants (46) only followed the governments use of drones 
somewhat closely, not too closely, or not at all (47). Only 14 answered very closely. 
 People had three major resources that they could access in order to obtain up-to-
date information daily. Table 11 dealt with the frequency the participants acquired their 
information from the television. 50 of the respondents answered either every day or most 
days, while 51 answered only occasionally and 6 answered once or twice a day. Table 12 
involved the print media and the results did well for the newspaper industry according to 
the data.  
Table 12. 
Television as News Source on Drones Followed by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Everyday 26 24.1 24.1 
Most days 24 22.2 22.2 
Once or twice a day 6 5.6 5.6 
Only occasionally 51 47.2 47.2 
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Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 Only nine people out of 108 got their information from the print media every day, 
while 81 responded only occasionally. This clearly showed that the contributors to the 
study did not utilize the print often because of the results of question seven involving the 
internet. 
Table 13.  
Print Media as News Source on Drones by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Everyday 9 8.3 8.3 
Most days 13 12.0 12.0 
Once or twice a day 4 3.7 3.7 
Only occasionally 81 75.0 75.0 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 The data in Table 13 showed that 86 of the 108 participants answered the question 
every day or most days. This was not unusual because of the ease to get connected with 
any news source at any time of the day. The number of cell phones in the country allowed 
individuals to find out the news in a by-the-minute-fashion that kept people informed 
faster than both television and newspapers. 
Table 14. 
Internet as News Source on Drones by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Everyday 53 49.1 49.1 
Most days 33 30.6 30.6 
Once or twice a day 8 7.4 7.4 
Only occasionally 13 12.0 12.0 
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Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 The concept of framing fundamentally dealt with the attention the media focused 
on certain events or topics and then placed them within a field of meaning (Goffman, 
1974). This was essential, because the framing served as a big influence on the people 
reading and/or watching it (Goffman, 1974). Framing theory proposed that how 
something was presented to the audience influenced the choices people made about how 
to process that information (Goffman, 1974). The framing of an issue had the potential to 
not only tell the audience what to think about, but also how to think about that issue 
(Goffman, 1974). 
 Thus tables 14 and 15 dealt with the media framing of drones as well as the 
influence it had over the participants. Question 8 on the survey asked about the way the 
media portrayed domestic drones’ effects their opinion. Of the 108 people 55 said no, 
while 31 said yes and 21 were not sure. A clear majority of the respondents did not feel 
that the way the media conducted its reporting on drones, had no effect on their opinion 
of them overall. The 31 that said yes, placed a lot of weight on the media framing in order 
to help them form their opinion. 
 
Table 15.  
Media Framing of Drones Thought by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
No 55 50.9 50.9 
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Not sure 21 19.4 19.4 
yes 31 28.7 28.7 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 The question posed for Table 15 dealt with how influential the media was in 
shaping their opinions on important issues. 80 individuals felt the media was very or 
somewhat influential. That showed that the media outlets did carry tremendous influence 
on shaping the opinions of the respondents. The media could portray an issue through an 
ideological lens, which also could play role in the decision-making process, only 27 felt 
that media was not influential at all. 
 
Table 16. 
Media Influence Affects the Walden Participant Pools Views on Drones 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Not influential at all 27 25.0 25.0 
Somewhat influential 58 53.7 53.7 
Very influential 22 20.4 20.4 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
  
Drones have shown their potential in war and other surveillance operations 
involving the CIA as well as the military; however, drones were increasingly being used 
within the United States police departments and federal agencies. In addition, drones 
were available to any citizen, which increased questions about privacy and 4th 
Amendment violations. This was the question posed on the mass survey and the results 
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were seen in table 16. Fifty people answered yes, they felt that drones did violate privacy 
rights., while 36 said no. Twenty-one were not sure. 
Question 11 dealt with whether the participants thought that domestic drone use 
was necessary to prevent crime, terrorism as well as identify terror suspects.  Fifty-four 
answered yes that this tool was necessary, while thirty-five said no and seventeen were 
not sure.  
Table 17. 
 Drone Invades Privacy as Seen by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
No 36 33.3 33.3 
Not sure 21 19.4 19.4 
Yes 50 46.3 46.3 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
Table 18.  
Drone use for Fighting Crime as Seen by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
No 35 32.4 32.4 
Not sure 17 15.7 15.7 
Yes 54 50.0 50.0 
[Decline to Answer] 1 .9 .9 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
  
 Question twelve asked what was the participants overall perception of drones? 
This was the first question that was available to compare to the targeted elites survey.  
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Most respondents from the mass survey had favorable (25) or somewhat favorable (51) 
opinion of drones, which was positive outcome for the people backing the use of drones 
both domestically and internationally. Only twenty-nine had an unfavorable view of 
drones in the mass survey.  However, among the targeted elite survey the opinions were 
looking at both sides of problem, but primarily being non-committal. For example, 
 Participant #1 responded “short term effective 
long term not convinced” 
 Participant #2 responded “Like any technology, they can have good or bad 
effects” 
Participant #3 responded “OK with surveillance drones, but I believe targeted 
killing is unacceptable” 
 Participant #4 responded “There are clearly many uses - "dangerous, difficult, 
dull" - to which drones can properly be put (the list grows each day); I know many are 
concerned at their us by the military, but I think it a major mistake to abstract drones 
from the wider matrix of violence in which they are embedded: 5-10 per cent of air strike 
sin Afghanistan were carried out directly from remote platforms, but why does nobody 
seem to care about the other 90-95%? Many of those strikes will have been mediated by 
drones, of course” 
 Participant #5 responded “Drones are a tool. The question is how they are used.” 
 
 Their answers seemed more favorable than not, which was genuinely the same 
feeling of the mass survey participants, which showed that the level of expertise was not 
important when it came to having a favorable or unfavorable opinion about drones 
overall. 
Table 19. 
 Perception of Drones by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Favorable 25 23.1 23.1 
Not favorable at all 29 26.9 26.9 
Somewhat favorable 51 47.2 47.2 
[Decline to Answer] 2 1.9 1.9 
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Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 In order to determine how knowledgeable, the mass survey participants were, 
question thirteen dealt with the number of news articles or stories they had seen 
concerning drones in the past year? The majority had only seen a news story or read an 
article 1 to 5 times, which was unfortunate. Forty-nine people had seen a news story or 
read an article between 6 and 15 times. The frequency was better and suggested that these 
participants were more informed and knowledgeable about news reports concerning 
drones. 
Table 20. 
 News Items Concerning Drones Seen by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
1 to 5 50 46.3 46.3 
6 to 10 29 26.9 26.9 
11-15 20 18.5 18.5 
None 8 7.4 7.4 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 The reporting of drones also consisted of drone surveillance within the U.S., 
which understandably has raised concerns for privacy advocates and lawmakers. This 
justified concern has led to convincing thirteen states to enact laws regulating the use of 
drones by law enforcement, with eleven of those thirteen states requiring a warrant before 
the government may use a drone (McNeal, 2014). The first drone-related legislation 
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appeared in 2013 in Florida, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
Virginia, and Texas (McNeal, 2014). As well as Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Utah, and 
Iowa also passed laws seeking to address the use of drones by law enforcement in 2014 
(McNeal, 2014); therefore, it was important to assess whether or not drone surveillance 
within the U.S. was personally important to the participants, given the efforts to regulate 
them. The results found that twenty-three participants had drone surveillance rated as 
high importance. Forty-eight were in the middle, twenty-six rated it of low importance, 
while nine said it was not of any importance to them personally.  
Table 21. 
Importance of Drone Surveillance Within the US Among the Walden Participant Pool 
Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
High 23 21.3 21.3 
In the middle 48 44.4 44.4 
Low 26 24.1 24.1 
Not at all 9 8.3 8.3 
[Decline to Answer] 1 .9 .9 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 An unintended consequence of drones was when they were used as weapons to 
kill terrorist leaders overseas and they caused civilian casualties. There were no definite 
answers to how many have been killed, but that depended upon who one asked. For 
example, Pakistan claimed that 700 civilians died due to US drone strikes from 2004-
2011, while the US put the figure considerably less (Bergen & Tiedemann, 2011). 
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Therefore, the question had to be posed to measure the level of concern the participants 
had for civilian safety during drone strikes. The results showed that sixty-seven of the 
participants were either “very or somewhat concerned.” Forty were either “not too 
concerned or not at all.” 
Table 22 
Civilian Casualties as A Result of Drone Strikes by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Not concerned at all 11 10.2 10.2 
Not too concerned 29 26.9 26.9 
Somewhat concerned 35 32.4 32.4 
Very concerned 32 29.6 29.6 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 Since the US increasingly relied on drone strikes to kill terrorist leaders for the 
foreseeable future, Table 22 dealt with the participants’ approval or disapproval of such 
strikes. 
Table 23. 
Drone Strikes to Kill Terrorists Leaders overseas by The Walden Participant Pool 
Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Approve 74 68.5 68.5 
Disapprove 21 19.4 19.4 
Not sure 12 11.1 11.1 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 




 The results said that seventy-four of the participants approved of drone strikes that 
killed terrorists, while only twenty-one disapproved and twelve were unsure. In contrast, 
four out of the five targeted elite participants disapproved of the drone strikes while one 
neither approved nor disapproved. Here were their responses: 
 “Disapprove with OBABA policy/DOJ White Paper suggests violation of 
international law and immorality” 
 “Disapprove. They are not effective and likely violate international law.” 
 “Disapprove--I do not believe in capital punishment, or in extrajudicial killing.” 
 “I disapprove of extra-judicial executions and assassinations. Not only are they 
poor instruments of public policy, such actions violate international law and constitute 
acts of terrorism themselves.” 
 
 Again, if more of the targeted elites participated, it would have been interesting to 
see how many more of them would go along with this type of thinking. Clearly, the four 
experts shared their disapproval of targeted strikes because of the violation of 
international law as well as extra-judicial killings. The similarities were uncanny in the 
words chosen to voice their disapproval. Most of the people in the Walden participant 
pool had no issues with targeted killings. 
The next question in the survey asked whether the participants agreed with the 
killing of US citizens without due process. At one point, an American was one of the 
targeted due to his radicalization of some of the Yemeni citizens. Overwhelmingly, the 
participants in the mass survey disapproved of this action, according to 92 of the 108 
respondents, with only six approving and nine unsure. Targeting terrorists was okay, but 
when one of those terrorists was identified as an American citizen, their opinions changed 
drastically. The targeted elites agreed with the mass public on this dilemma where all five 
expressed their disapproval. 
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Table 24.  
Due Process Needed to Kill US Citizens Overseas Among the Walden Participant Pool 
Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Disapprove 92 85.2 85.2 
Not sure 9 8.3 8.3 
Approve 6 5.6 5.6 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 “No. For the reasons outlined in my answers to question 2 and question 4. 
Additionally, given the long history of political repression in this country (such as, the 
FBI's surveillance of the anti-war and civil rights movements) that has sometimes turned 
violent (such as the FBI's actions against the Black Panther and 
Socialist Workers Parties) I fear that such assassinations could be more politically 
motivated than national security motivated.” 
 “That's a matter for US citizens -- I'm not one -- and to fasten on the killing of 
Americans as opposed to others is narcissism.” 
 “Disapprove regardless of whether the target is a citizen or not.” 
 “It is a violation of the Constitution and basic human rights” 
 “disapprove/suspicious of unfettered executive power 
favor establishment DRONE COURT” 
 
 Whether an expert on drones or not, both sides had common ground with the 
killing of US citizens. Table 24 showed the data from the question that asked whether the 
constitutionality of the President to order drone strikes on US citizens. The Walden 
participant pool overwhelmingly thought it was unconstitutional with 82 of the 108 
feeling that way.  Only eleven believed it was constitutional, while ten were not sure. 
Again, the targeted elites agreed with the mass opinion.  
Table 25.  
Constitutionality of Killing US Citizens as Seen by The Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Constitutional 11 10.2 10.2 
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Not sure 10 9.3 9.3 
Unconstitutional 82 75.9 75.9 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 “constitutional with executive power BUT needs to be subject to pre-emptive 
judicial authorization (per drone court)” 
 “No. The constitution affords citizens due process. I am not aware of any 
constitutional exceptions to this.” 
 “Unconstitutional, as it lacks due process” 
 “That's a matter for US citizens -- I'm not one -- and to fasten on the killing of 
Americans as opposed to others is narcissism.” 
 “It is unconstitutional as both the 5th and 14th Amendment prohibit the taking of 
life or fundamental liberties without the due process of law. In our system, people must 
be convicted of crimes by a court--not murdered because the President merely thinks 
something.” 
 
 The next question dealt with the level of concern over drone strikes leading to 
retaliatory strikes against the US. In table 25, 30 of the respondents were either not 
concerned at all or not too concerned, while 45 were somewhat concerned and 32 were 
very concerned. Most of the participants (77) had concerns that the US drone strikes 
would lead to some type of retaliatory strike against this country. In the targeted elites 
survey, four were very concerned and only one was a little concerned. Again, the 
majority here were concerned over drone strikes leading to an attack against the US. 
Most of the participants in both surveys showed a high level of worry about what US 
drone strikes could lead to. 
Table 26. 
Drone Strike Retaliation from Terrorists Among the Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Not concerned at all 7 6.5 6.5 
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Not too concerned 23 21.3 21.3 
Somewhat concerned 45 41.7 41.7 
Very concerned 32 29.6 29.6 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 I combined the next two questions onto table 26, which asked about the 
effectiveness that drones would have on protecting US citizens from crime and terrorism. 
The results showed that 64 contributors felt drones were effective or very effective in 
protecting its citizens from crime and terrorism while most of the participants were 
skeptical of the effectiveness of the drones on such acts where 150 believed they were 
only somewhat effective or not effective at all. 
Table 27. 
 Effectiveness of Drones Protecting the Homeland Among the Walden Participant Pool 
Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Not effective at all 64 59.2 59.2 
Somewhat effective 86 79.7 79.7 
Very effective 25 23.1 23.1 
Total 216 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
The targeted elites responded in the following way: 
“There's no single answer to crime or terrorism; unarmed drones MAY be part of 
the solution, but they are unlikely to be a major part” 
“Not the most effective, but might help in some cases” 
“Probably not; criminals and terrorists are adaptive” 
“enhances but unclear to what degree” 
“No. Terrorism and crime are facts of life that cannot be prevented by 




The targeted elites essentially felt the same way as the participant pool, in that 
they felt drones were not an effective tool in protecting the homeland by preventing 
terrorists and criminal acts. 
Privacy was an issue that often surfaced when it came to drone surveillance over 
the US, and that was the next question asked in both surveys: Do you think Americans 
will have to give up some of their personal freedoms in order to make room for drone 
surveillance over the U.S.? The contributors from the Walden participant pool 
overwhelming felt that they would, because 2 of the 108 said yes, 25 said no, and 10 were 
unsure. The five targeted elites answered the same question the following way; three said 
yes, one unsure, and one no. The majority in both groups felt that some privacy would 
have to be given up by US citizens, so drone surveillance could and continue to take 
place to protect them. 
Table 28. 
Giving Up Some Privacy for Drone Surveillance among the Walden Participant Pool 
Sample 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
No 25 23.1 23.1 
Not sure 10 9.3 9.3 
Yes 72 66.7 66.7 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 The questioning continued with drone surveillance and privacy in table 28, this 
question revolved around the level of concern about the intrusiveness of drone 
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surveillance with 64 of the participant pool, was either very concerned or somewhat 
concerned, whereas 43 were either not too concerned or not concerned at all.   The 
targeted elite’s responses ranged from two not too concerned, two somewhat concerned, 
and one very concerned. Interestingly, the experts were not as concerned as the 
participant pool was. Thirty-seven of them were very concerned, including one from the 
targeted elites, a combined 29 were somewhat concerned and 29 not too concerned.  
Table 29.  
Intrusiveness of Drone Surveillance among the Walden Participant Pool Sample 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Not concerned at all 16 14.8 14.8 
Not too concerned 27 25.0 25.0 
Somewhat concerned 27 25.0 25.0 
Very concerned 37 34.3 34.3 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 Any type of surveillance within the US created a situation where the government 
could abuse its power and authority. Which was exactly the next question asked that dealt 
with the participants’ level of concern. 84 were either very concerned or somewhat 
concerned, while 22 were either not too concerned or not concerned at all. The responses 
from the targeted elite consisted of two very concerned and three somewhat concerned. 
Table 30. 
 Governmental Abuse of Power with Drone Surveillance among the Walden Participant 
Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Not concerned at all 4 3.7 3.7 
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Not too concerned 18 16.7 16.7 
Somewhat concerned 33 30.6 30.6 
Very concerned 51 47.2 47.2 
[Decline to Answer] 1 .9 .9 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 Drones were popular among the US population where drones could be purchased 
just about anywhere nowadays, which led to this question posed in the survey on whether 
the participants approved or disapproved of drone use by normal citizens. The Walden 
participant break down was as follows: 58 of them disapproved, while 35 approved.  The 
targeted elites were split where two approved and two disapproved while one was not 
sure. 
Table 31.  
Drone Use by Civilians among the Walden Participant Pool Sample 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Approve 35 32.4 32.4 
Disapprove 58 53.7 53.7 
Not sure 14 13.0 13.0 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 The last question involved policy and privacy, for instance, 15 states have 
implemented rules and regulations for domestic drones prior to the federal government. 
Do you think this type of proactive governing will help protect citizens’ civil rights? A 
clear majority of the Walden participant pool thought that creating laws for drones would 
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assist in protecting the rights of citizens, while only 26 said no, this type of proactive 
governing would not make a difference. However, 26 of the participants were not sure 
whether these types of laws would help or hurt. The targeted elites were asked why to the 
previous question and the best response was as follows: 
 “Well, it depends on what the regulations are. If they are like Virginia and Oregon 
and require a warrant for drone surveillance and ban the use of weaponized drones than 
there is a decent chance they are helpful. If they are like North Dakota that permits 
weaponized drones I would say they are less than helpful.” 
  
 While the other four participants were less forthcoming with responses like yes, 
not sure, probably not, and one skipped the question. There were not a lot of comparisons 
that could be drawn; however, the elites were more hesitant about state laws being 
created that would help with the governing of drone boundaries. 
Table 32. 
 Policy and Regulation of Drone Use Among the Walden Participant Pool Sample 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
No 26 24.1 24.1 
Not sure 26 24.1 24.1 
Yes 55 50.9 50.9 
Total 108 100.0 100.0 
Source: Walden Participant Pool 
 
 The data overall showed how similar in thought the two groups were when it 
came to privacy and drone use but differed slightly on drone strikes and those used to 
target American citizens. The two groups also agreed that it was unconstitutional for a 
President to conduct drone strikes on US citizens. The data also showed on numerous 
occasions involving drone surveillance within the United States in particular, both sides 
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agreed on the invasion of privacy. In addition, the data suggested that no matter the level 
of expertise on drones, both sides agreed on the issues involving drone use within the US. 
Conclusions 
 The data assisted me in answering my research questions.  RQ1: What level of 
political knowledge regarding drone usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in 
the United States? The data showed that both groups possessed knowledge of drone 
usage overseas and within the United States. Table 10 showed that just over half of the 
participants frequently looked at news reports regarding drones. In addition, the data also 
showed that both groups generally agreed on the survey questions regarding drones and 
privacy, the constitutionality of drone strikes on US citizens, the ineffectiveness of drones 
to combat and prevent crime, as well as the effectiveness of drone strikes to eliminate 
terror leaders overseas. The fact that these two groups came to the same conclusions 
implied that no matter the level of expertise in drone information, they agreed on several 
points. The importance of their agreements also suggested that it did not matter where the 
participants got their information about drones from, the print media, internet, or 
television it did not affect their views on drones neither negatively nor positively. Since, 
my targeted elites were already well versed in drones, the political knowledge was 
encompassed in it. 
 Research Question 2. How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on 
domestic policy in the United States? Policy elites were not in favor of drone surveillance 
within the United States due to privacy concerns. It was understandable for any person to 
expect a reasonable amount of privacy within their own home, and now that civilian 
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drones were abundantly available, the privacy invasion risk grew. Therefore, whether a 
targeted elite or not, the loss of privacy was a concern for both groups. Research 
Question 3. How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use on domestic 
policy in the United States? The mass public overwhelmingly found drone impact on 
domestic policy was very intrusive on privacy. In table 28 for instance, 64 of the108 
respondents were either very or somewhat concerned. In addition, table showed the 
potential for governmental abuse of drone use within the United States and 84 of the 108 
participants were either very or somewhat concerned. The mass public not surprisingly 
did want to place its trust in the government to not find a way to overreach when it came 
to abusing the technology that drones could possess. Cameras with facial recognition and 
small drones that were hard to detect worried the public, as well it should. 
 When trying to conduct a survey about the opinion of people, the number of 
participants was important. I was fortunate enough to acquire 108 participants from the 
Walden participant pool; however, when a Likert-scale type questioning the potential 
existed for certain questions not being answered or the individual checking the ‘prefer not 
to answer box” obviously, there was nothing I could do about that except hope that they 
main portions of the survey concerning drones was answered. The data was also limited 
with the lack of targeted elites responding to my survey. Again, it was impossible for me 
to convince potential participants to take the time to fill out a survey, but the five who did 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this descriptive study was to gauge the impact that drones had on 
U.S. domestic policy and measure the feelings and attitudes towards these impacts. These 
goals were achieved by surveying mass opinion, while additionally providing targeted 
surveys of elites who have greater knowledge of these potential impacts than the general 
public. This allowed me to analyze comparisons and contradictions between the two 
groups to determine if they drew the same conclusions about drone policy and if it 
invaded privacy. In order to execute this research, I conducted a frequency analysis on a 
convenience survey of the mass public and a purposive survey of policy elites with expert 
knowledge on drones, so I could comprehend the opinions of two distinct groups of 
individuals. 
Guided by theories of media framing and salience, mass opinion was measured 
with frequency and a cross-sectional design achieved by using the Walden Participant 
Pool. The survey was administered to a targeted population of elites, which included 
academics, civil liberties organizations, and government officials (ie., executive agencies, 
the military, and law enforcement). The instrument gauged what policy areas were likely 
to be impacted by drone adoption, and elicited attitudes towards these changes, with a 
focus on how allowing enhanced drone surveillance has impacted the right to privacy. 
Summary of findings 
The primary goal of the study was to address how policy elites and the mass 
public perceived the impact of drone use on domestic policy. The first group involved the 
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Walden Participant Pool, which consisted of non-experts on drone warfare. The Walden 
participant pool consisted of 108 and respondents to a 32-question survey. The hope was 
to acquire a large enough sample size that represented the population in general to make 
valid comparisons. The second group was the targeted elites, which consisted of scholars 
who wrote peer-reviewed articles on drones, people from the ACLU, DoD, DOJ, 
Legislative Attorneys, RAND Corporation, and the FAA 
Demographics 
Of the 108 participants in the Walden participant pool, five declined to answer, 
while 13 preferred not to answer; therefore, 18 of the 108 participants did not want to 
answer the question about race. The 18 who did not answer only represented 16.6% of 
the total participants. The remaining breakdown of the respondents consisted of 38 
European Americans, 22 who chose other, 11 African Americans, eight Hispanic 
Americans, seven Asian Americans, and three Muslims. The representation of the 
Walden participant pool was important because there were many racial viewpoints that 
were being assessed in this survey. For the gender breakdown of the survey, there were 
79 female respondents compared to only 24 male respondents, as well as four who 
preferred not to answer. It would be preferable to have the numbers closer to half-and-
half instead of having this many more women. 
For the breakdown of religious preferences from the participants, four declined to 
answer the question at all and nine preferred not to answer. The remaining breakdown 
was as follows: 15 identified their religious preference as Catholic, three as Islam, two as 
Jewish, 45 as other, and 29 as Protestant. The number of individuals, who chose other, 
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suggested that I needed to include more types of religion in order to have a clearer 
assessment of who preferred which type of religion in order to determine how that 
affected their opinion on drones. 
To delve deeper into the demographics of the participants, they were also asked 
about their political ideology/ affiliation. Three declined to answer the question, which 
was an insignificant amount that did not call into question the validity of the survey. 
However, 41 people identified themselves as Democrat, which suggested that most of the 
people in the survey used this ideology in their reasoning behind how they felt about 
drones. Twenty-nine people identified themselves as independent, which meant the 
second highest number of people in the survey claimed to have no political affiliation and 
were open-minded when it came to drones. Twenty people identified themselves as 
Republicans, while 14 identified themselves as other. There was some overbalance to the 
respondents, which showed some representation of all political affiliations. 
Age representation was more balanced than any other of the demographic 
questions. Ages 25 through 64 had 98 of the 108 participants, which accounted for 90.7% 
of the respondents. There were two between the ages of 18-24 and six between the ages 
of 65-74, with one who preferred not to answer. Most of the participants had a college 
degree or were currently working on a graduate level degree. Of the 108 participants, 98 
listed a 4-year college or graduate school as their highest level of education completed. 
The data suggested that the participants were educated, thus possibly knowledgeable 
about drones and their use. Although these individuals were not experts on drones, they 
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accessed information about it and were aware of the U.S. drone program and what it was 
currently being used for as well as its suggested future uses. 
The targeted elites only had five participants, where none of them answered the 
question about race. Four out of the five were male with only one female, but all five 
completed graduate school, which helped explain why they were targeted elites. When I 
asked about their religious preference, one was Jewish, one was Protestant, while two 
preferred not to answer, and one said other. When asked about their political affiliation, 
one said Democrat, two skipped the question, and two said other. Finally, when asked 
about their age, two identified themselves between the ages of 55-64, one between the 
ages of 45-54, one between 25-34, and one between 35-44. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The data were collected through two surveys: a Likert-scale 32 question survey 
for the Walden participant pool and a 16-question Likert-scale survey with an addition of 
open-ended questions for the targeted elite.   
Walden Participant Pool 
It was important for me to establish how the participants knew of or heard about 
drones, which was why I asked questions that determined their knowledge of drones. For 
example, on Question 12 I asked what was the participants overall perception of drones? 
Most respondents had favorable (25) or somewhat favorable (51) opinion of drones, 
while only 29 had an unfavorable view of drones.  To determine how knowledgeable, the 
mass survey participants were, Question 13 dealt with the number of news articles or 
stories they have seen concerning drones in the past year. The majority had only seen a 
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news story or read an article one to five times. Forty-nine people had seen a news story or 
read an article between six and 15 times. A national survey showed that U.S. voters were 
paying attention to drones, where 65% said they had heard some or a lot about drones and 
15% said they had heard nothing (Zenko, 2013). 
Media outlets recognized that they could take advantage of the various social 
media outlets as a means for disseminating news and opinions about any subject 
(Qayyum, Gilani, Latif, & Qadir, 2018).  Through social media, news organizations from 
all over the world could spread political messages, engage their supporters, drive election 
campaigns, and challenge their critics about drones (Qayyum et al., 2018). Further, news 
agencies, many of which aimed to give an impression of balance, often abided by a 
political ideology that was reflected in the content they produced (Qayyum et al., 2018). 
Therefore, they had the potential to influence public opinion on the use drones (Qayyum 
et al., 2018).  Two of the questions I posed to the Walden participant pool (8 & 9) dealt 
with how influential they thought the media was in shaping their opinions on drones and 
other important issues. Most of the participants felt the media was very or somewhat 
influential. The media outlets did carry influence on shaping the opinions of the 
respondents. 
The media could portray an issue through an ideological lens, which also could 
play a role in the decision-making process, only 27 felt that the media was not influential 
at all. The media performed two functions within a democracy: They published the events 
of the day in the form of news, and they offered their unique commentary (Habel, 2012). 
While delivering the news there was a volume of evidence showing that the media 
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framed issues and primed their audience (Habel, 2012).  There were two trains of thought 
in which people believed that the media should offer an independent, adversarial voice 
that moved the views of both politicians and the public, and ultimately, changed the 
course of public policy or on the other hand, viewed the media as reactive, where their 
views could be influenced by policymakers (Habel, 2012). 
Habel, tested the two perspectives by assessing the policy positions of the media 
through the use of the ADA ratings; a method that could be extended to other media 
including editorial pages, radio personalities, syndicated columnists, pundits, bloggers, or 
other media elites in which he modeled together with metrics for policymakers and the 
public in a dynamic, time series analysis (Habel, 2012). Habel found that the editorials 
did not provide a whole lot of influence over public opinion overall, thus not affecting 
policy unless you were of a particular ideology, then the media could use editorials to 
draw attention to the issues of their choice and to make their views transparent, which in 
turn could be “surprisingly successful” in influencing the agenda of policymakers or the 
public (Habel, 2012).   In addition, Habel found it plausible that the media outlets were 
also successful in framing or priming political issues or events, and that these attempts 
mattered for public policy or opinion which allowed the outlets to act as agenda-setters, 
for policymakers and the public (Habel, 2012). Shanahan, McBeth, and Hathaway used 
one policy narrative from the media on their respondents, which indicated that these 
narrative components could be very powerful in creating and magnifying the meaning of 
policy issues and their consequences (Shanahan, McBeth, & Hathaway, 2011). Thus, 
these policy narratives mattered in terms of how people thought concerning policy issues 
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and influenced their opinion (Shanahan, McBeth, & Hathaway, 2011). In addition, more 
recent studies concluded similar findings with respect media framing towards the public. 
For example, a study found that late-night comedies mostly gathered news and 
information from traditional news media and re-packaged it, so they gave it a new 
interpretation, before they presented the easily digestible information to a different set of 
audiences (Lee, 2017). Also, a study found that the US ran ore negative stories about the 
refugee crisis, thus leading to a negative attitude from the public whereas, the Canadian 
press was more positive, which lead to the public attitude there being more in favor of the 
plight of the refugees (Allwright, 2018). 
The questions from the survey that dealt with privacy, intrusiveness, and the 
potential for governmental abuse were combined because of their similarities. When the 
survey turned to asking about the possibility and probability that drones were 
increasingly being used within the United States by police departments, federal agencies, 
and private citizens, which may lead to privacy concerns, fifty people answered yes, they 
felt that drones did violate privacy rights., while 36 said no. 21 were not sure. In addition, 
when asked about the potential for domestic drone use to prevent crime, terrorism and 
identify terror suspects, 54 answered yes that this tool was necessary, while 35 said no 
and seventeen were not sure. Any type of surveillance within the US created a situation 
where the government could abuse its power and authority. Which was exactly the next 
question asked dealing with the participants’ level of concern. 84 were either very 
concerned or somewhat concerned, while 22 were either not too concerned or not 
concerned at all. The participants were asked about their level of concern about the 
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intrusiveness of drone surveillance with 64 of the participant pool was either very 
concerned or somewhat concerned, whereas 43 were either not too concerned or not 
concerned at all.   The current literature seemed to back this up. For example, a study 
found that through exploring surveillance consciousness of mobile technology 
surveillance, that people thought that current surveillance technologies came close to 
making the US an oppressed state, whereas others were willing to accept certain types of 
surveillance as long as some conditions were met (Zaia, 2018).  In addition, some were 
concerned about the possibility of low-cost drones available to anyone that could allow 
criminals and adversaries the ability to conduct malicious activity, in addition to hacking 
an armed drone in turn which could be unleashed within the US (Maida, 2016). One 
study found that the people in federal and state agencies felt that individuals forfeited 
their rights to privacy the moment they stepped outside, whereas most of the public felt 
that despite being in public they were afforded some privacy (Hernandez, 2018). These 
results from my data were also consisted with polling done by professional polling 
entities. 
A Monmouth University poll done in 2013, they asked a national sample of adults 
about three possible uses of unmanned drones by U.S. law enforcement, in which, an 
overwhelming majority of Americans supported the idea of using drones to help with 
search and rescue missions (83%) (Monmouth, 2013).    Six-in-ten also supported using 
drones to control illegal immigration on the nation's borders (62%), but the public felt 
that oversight was needed for law enforcement before use of drones, 76% of Americans 
polled said that law enforcement agencies should be required to obtain a warrant from a 
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judge before using drones while only 14% said that law enforcement agencies should be 
able to decide on their own when to use drones (Monmouth, 2013).  47% said they were 
at least somewhat confident that federal law enforcement agencies would use drones 
appropriately, but 49% were not confident (Monmouth, 2013).  44% were confident that 
their local police departments would use drones appropriately, while 51% were not 
confident (Monmouth, 2013). Lastly, only about 1-in-10 Americans were "very" 
confident in federal (11%) and local (12%) agencies' potential use of drones (Monmouth, 
2013). 
When my survey asked the Walden Participant Pool about drone strikes overseas 
the responses were consistent and heavily in favor of it. For instance, 74 of the 
participants approved of drone strikes that kill terrorists, while only 21 disapproved and 
12 were unsure. These numbers from my data were supported by the national polling 
places that asked the same question. For example, Pew research showed that most of the 
public (56%) continued to support missile strikes overseas to target extremists in 
countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia with just 26% of those in the survey who 
disapproved (Pew Research, 2013).  Rasmussen Reports did a national telephone survey 
that found that 71% of likely U.S. Voters favored the United States’ use of drone aircraft 
to kill al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists overseas, while only 12% opposed the use of 
drones to kill terrorists in other countries (Rasmussen, 2014). In addition, when the 
participant pool was asked about airstrikes being used on American citizens without due 
process the response was overwhelmingly against it with 92 of the 108 participants 
disapproving. Many of the opinions were consisted with current literature, for example, 
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those that exuded who scored high on the authority/respect dimension were much more 
likely to accept positive beliefs about drone strikes, and reject negative beliefs (Davis, 
2019). Whereas, those who scored high on the harm/care dimension were much more 
likely to accept negative beliefs and reject the idea that drone strikes were necessary for 
protecting the United States from terrorist attack (Davis, 2019). In addition, another study 
found that the public was more likely to support use because they thought that was 
riskless because it kept our soldiers from danger, but the public also thought by increased 
accountability, leaders must carefully choose how they used drones (Shelby, 2017). If 
leaders disregarded those risks, it could cost them, so they may think twice about using 
drones in a way that went against established norms (Shelby, 2017). 
My data was inconsistent with national polling even though the wording was 
somewhat different. For example, a CBS poll asked in 2011 “Is it ever okay for the 
United States to authorize the killing of an American citizen in a foreign country if that 
person is known to be a terrorist, or is that never okay?” (Zenko, 2013). 53% of the 
respondents said it was ok, 35% said it was never ok, while 12% were unsure (Zenko, 
2013). Also, a Pew research poll in 2012 asked “What if those suspected terrorists are 
American citizens living in other countries? In that case, do you approve or disapprove of 
the use of drones? (Zenko, 2013).” 79% approved while only 17% disapproved,  my 
participants reacted negatively to the killing of US citizens and did not agree with the 
national public in those polls; however, my question was not asked during the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan so maybe public opinion changed slightly if the questioned was 
posed again nationally. When the participant pool was asked about the potential danger 
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for civilian casualties, the responses showed that 67 were very or somewhat concerned 
while 40 were slightly concerned or not concerned at all. Again, my data was consistent 
with national polling; a Pew Research poll showed that 53% said they were very 
concerned about whether drone strikes put the lives of civilians in danger (Pew Research 
2013). When the question asked about the constitutionality of the President to order drone 
strikes on US citizens. The Walden participant pool overwhelmingly thought it was 
unconstitutional with 82 of the 108 feeling that way.  Only eleven believed it is 
constitutional. according to a recent national survey of registered voters by Fairleigh 
Dickinson University’s PublicMind, 48% of American voters said they thought it was 
illegal for the U.S. government to target its own citizens living abroad with drone attacks 
while only 24% said it was legal (Zenko, 2013). Again, the wording was different, 
because I specifically asked about the President, but the results were similar in that both 
groups thought the United States cannot do it. 
Another question asked about the level of concern over drone strikes in foreign 
countries leading to retaliatory strikes against the US. Here, 30 of the respondents were 
either not concerned at all or not too concerned, while 45 were somewhat concerned and 
32 were very concerned. In a Pew Research poll found that 31% of its respondents said 
they were “very” concerned that drone attacks could lead to extremist retaliation. Another 
37 percent said they were “somewhat” concerned about retaliation, while 30 percent said 
they were “not too” or “not at all” concerned (Pew Research, 2013).The Walden 
participant pool responses were consistent with a national poll, thus making public 




There was an increasing reliance on experts for guidance in various aspects of 
decision making involving any number of social issues (Chan, 1998). Expert opinion was 
commonly used in solutions that the country was facing in order to persuade the public 
that they had finite conclusions that could solve problems (Chan, 1998). Expert opinion 
was important because of the widening gap that existed between those who had 
specialized knowledge in modern technology and those who did not (Chan, 1998). As a 
result, most of the public had become more dependent than ever on experts to formulate 
judgments on policy issues that affected their lives (Campbell, 1991). Expert influence on 
people's social and political attitudes could assist in determining how an individual could 
feel on an issue, because of the way that expertise was portrayed to be accompanied by 
their professional knowledge and experience (Chan, 1998).  Expert sources had been 
given an increasing amount of precious news space and airtime to explain any myriad of 
economic problems, interpret policy issues, decipher health statistics, and predict 
society's future (Chan, 1998). I intentionally used sources from over 30 years ago in order 
to show, that no matter the era, expert opinion was utilized often and was highly 
regarded. Therefore, when one fast-forwards to today and when the discussions turned to 
drones, experts on the subject used their knowledge and their capabilities and brought the 
issue to light, but was there opinion any different than that of the lay publics on drones? 
My data suggested they did not on certain survey questions. For example, in the survey 
that I sent to the targeted elites, they were asked if they approved of drone strikes to kill 
terrorists, their answers differed from the Walden participant pool:  
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Participant #1 responded “short term effective long term not convinced” 
Participant #2 responded “Like any technology, they can have good or bad 
effects” 
Participant #3 responded “OK with surveillance drones, but I believe targeted 
killing is unacceptable” 
Participant #4 responded “There are clearly many uses - "dangerous, difficult, 
dull" - to which drones can properly be put (the list grows each day); I know many are 
concerned at their us by the military, but I think it a major mistake to abstract drones 
from the wider matrix of violence in which they are embedded: 5-10 per cent of air strike 
sin Afghanistan were carried out directly from remote platforms, but why does nobody 
seem to care about the other 90-95%? Many of those strikes will have been mediated by 
drones, of course” 
Participant #5 responded “Drones are a tool. The question is how they are used.” 
 
It was important to note again, that there were national polls conducted on drones, 
but none that involved “expert” opinion which did not allow me to compare my targeted 
elites with other polling institutions. However, a qualitative study was done that used ten 
expert participants that were selected from academic institutions, think tanks, private 
organizations, and Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence who was 
involved in teaching, researching, publishing, and speaking on the topic of terrorism 
(Johnson, 2013). Johnson’s case study employed open-ended questions to explore 
participants’ perceptions and opinions of the killing of US citizens by drone strikes 
(Johnson, 2013). Two of the questions I asked dealt with the constitutionality of killing a 
US citizen suspected of terrorism and what were their thoughts on killing a US citizen 
without due process.  My targeted elite were against both: 
Participant 1: “constitutional with executive power BUT needs to be subject to 
pre-emptive judicial authorization (per drone court)” “No. For the reasons outlined in my 
answers to question 2 and question 4.Additionally, given the long history of political 
repression in this country (such as, the FBI's surveillance of the anti-war and civil rights 
movements) that has sometimes turned violent (such as the FBI's actions against the 
Black Panther and Socialist Workers Parties) I fear that such assassinations could be 
more politically motivated than national security motivated.” 
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Participant 2: No. The constitution affords citizens due process. I am not aware of 
any constitutional exceptions to this.” “That's a matter for US citizens -- I'm not one -- 
and to fasten on the killing of Americans as opposed to others is narcissism.” 
Participant 3: “Unconstitutional, as it lacks due process” “Disapprove regardless 
of whether the target is a citizen or not.” 
Participant 4: “That's a matter for US citizens -- I'm not one -- and to fasten on the 
killing of Americans as opposed to others is narcissism.” “It is a violation of the 
Constitution and basic human rights” 
Participant 5: “It is unconstitutional as both the 5th and 14th Amendment prohibit 
the taking of life or fundamental liberties without the due process of law. In our system, 
people must be convicted of crimes by a court--not murdered because the President 
merely thinks something.” “disapprove/suspicious of unfettered executive power favor 
establishment DRONE COURT” 
 
In Johnson’s study, he asked about the killing of two US citizens by a drone 
strike, his participants overall were consistent in their opinion that the killing of Anwar 
al-Awlaki was both necessary and desirable but most expressed a general feeling that the 
killing was problematic for effective counterterrorism policies because the  killings 
targeted  American citizens, and there was a continuing question over whether they were 
granted constitutionally guaranteed due process of law prior to being targeted for killing 
(Johnson, 2013).  Two of his participants responded this way (identified as T001 and 
T002): 
T001: Well, I have mixed feelings and I guess I would describe it as a slippery 
slope. I would also use; I guess a statement about the law, bad cases made bad law. 
Obviously, this is a very bad case and you’re dealing with a very bad situation and a bad 
person. You understand why the killing would occur and you may be able to not object. 
You may be able to say I understand that and that was necessary under the circumstances 
if that was the only way to proceed, and perhaps it was the only way to proceed. 
However, because they are American citizens, I’m concerned again about the slippery 
slope. Now one particular case where it may be necessary meaning there aren’t any 
alternatives, which make it necessary. Maybe followed by the stare decision and legal 
reasoning where you then proceed from that premise to a similar situation of killing 
another American citizen in different circumstances may be not exactly the same and it’s 
justified under the precedent previous case, and where that becomes very, very 
dangerous. My opinion, my perception is it may have been necessary in those cases if no 
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other options were available. I don’t know if other options were available or not. But if 
that may have been the case and then in which case, I would say it may have been 
necessary. But my opinion about it is it’s a very dangerous slippery slope. And I’m very 
wary of its further application (Johnson, 2013, p.57). 
T002: Well, on the one hand, I’m glad he’s dead. I think he was pretty clearly 
guilty, pretty clearly a threat. I do have serious reservations with the fact that he was an 
American citizen. I think there needs to be a whole other level of scrutiny and I don’t 
trust a White House that just says there was, that “Well, we have some rules,” you know. 
Well, you know, I think that in a democracy those need to be shared and taking the step 
of killing an American citizen a huge one. I’m a little bit afraid at this point it is now a 
small step to killing an American citizen on American soil. And that I have huge 
problems with as well. There needs to be a lot more thorough vetting and I think, for 
example, the use of drone strikes in particular is a decidedly bad idea and it will-- and it 
can be effective in very limited senses. But we’ve killed too many innocent people and 
we’ve been wrong too many times. And I think we’ve gone after too many low level 
targets. We’ve apparently prostituted our program to the Pakistanis in order to get 
agreements with them about using their airspace and things. And I would be a lot more 
comfortable if there was a drone strike five times a year hitting a high-value target and if 
there was a couple of civilian causalities that were unavoidable then you pay off the 
families pretty handsomely and hope for the best. (Johnson, 2013, p.58). 
 
The most glaring difference was the lengthy answers his participants gave, most 
likely because he was able to sit across from them and interview them face-to-face. They 
were for the killings, but expressed their concerns of what it could lead to in the future, 
whereas my targeted elite were against it and concerned about the abuse of power. 
Regardless, both targeted elites knew of the danger these targeted killings posed, but 
most importantly, it also suggested to me that more information on the details of the 
policies and procedures was needed for the public to intelligently debate the process in 
connection with some type of judicial oversight along with Congressional oversight 
(Johnson, 2013).  The elites in both studies clearly needed more than the insufficient 
words of whomever sat in the White House alone in order to determine the legality and if 
constitutional due process was guaranteed in such drone measures (Johnson, 2013). 
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The data overall in my study showed how similar in thought the two groups were 
when it came to privacy and drone use but differed slightly on drone strikes and those 
used to target American citizens. The two groups also agreed that it was unconstitutional 
for a President to conduct drone strikes on US citizens. The data also showed on 
numerous occasions involving drone surveillance within the United States in particular, 
both sides agreed on the invasion of privacy. In addition, this data suggested that no 
matter the level of expertise on drones, both sides agreed on the issues involving drone 
use within the US. Thus, the results of the data assisted me in answering my three 
primary research questions. 
Research Question 1 
What level of political knowledge regarding drone usage do policy elites and the 
mass public possess in the United States? The data exhibited that both groups of 
participants had knowledge of drone usage overseas which were used for targeted killings 
of terror leaders to include American citizens, as well as surveillance within the United 
States. Table 10 showed that more than half of the participants consistently looked at 
news reports regarding drones, whether it was the print, media, or internet. So, the 
participants were able to answer the questionnaire with an informed opinion. In addition, 
the data also showed that both groups generally agreed on the survey questions regarding 
drones and privacy, the constitutionality of drone strikes on US citizens, the 
ineffectiveness of drones to combat and prevent crime, as well as the effectiveness of 
drone strikes to eliminate terror leaders overseas. The fact that these two groups came to 
the same conclusions implied that no matter the level of expertise in drone information, 
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they agreed on several points. The importance of their agreements also suggested that it 
did not matter where the participants got their information about drones from, the print 
media, internet, or television it did not affect their views on drones neither negatively nor 
positively. Since, my targeted elites were already well versed in drones, the political 
knowledge was encompassed within it. 
Research Question 2 
How do policy elites perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in the 
United States? Targeted elites were not in favor of drone surveillance within the United 
States due to privacy concerns, which was understandable due to the increased presence 
of civilian drones. Therefore, whether a targeted elite or not, the loss of privacy was a 
concern for both groups. 
Research Question 3 
How does the mass public perceive the impact of drone use on domestic policy in 
the United States? The mass public opinion overwhelmingly found drone impact on 
domestic policy as very intrusive on privacy. Table 28 showed that 64 of the108 
respondents were either very or somewhat concerned. In addition, table 29 showed the 
potential for governmental abuse of drone use within the United States and 84 of the 108 
participants were either very or somewhat concerned. It was no surprise that the mass 
public had reservations about the potential of governmental overreach when it came to 
the technological advances that drones could possess. For example, cameras with facial 
recognition and small drones that could be hard to detect worried the public, as well it 
should.  This poll data was on par with other professional polling done on the subject. In 
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a Monmouth University poll conducted in 2013, the routine deployment of law 
enforcement drones could raise privacy issues, where 2-in-3 Americans expressed 
concern in this area.  Specifically, 49% of Americans would be very concerned and 20% 
would be somewhat concerned about their own privacy if U.S. law enforcement started 
using unmanned drones with high tech surveillance cameras and recording equipment 
(Monmouth, 2013).  In addition, a Rasmussen poll done in the same year showed that 
52% of voters opposed, while only 30% were in favor the use of unmanned drones for 
domestic surveillance (Rasmussen, 2013). As stated before, my data involving the 
Walden participant pool was consistent with national polling entities. 
Implications: Literature 
The literature involved with drones was extensive; however, the research 
combined with public opinion was less so in recent studies.  For example, research had 
investigated the use of drones by police with the focus on the effectiveness and efficiency 
in crime control, especially with respect to community policing in recent years 
(Sakiyama, et al., 2017).  In their research, she used participants recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) (Sakiyama, et al.,2017).  The authors asked participants about 
their involvement with police etc., in order to gauge their attitudes, whether positive or 
negative towards police and their use of UAVs in their communities (Sakiyama, et al., 
2017).   They found that the more negative attitude toward the police significantly 
increased the chances of them being less supportive of drone use (Sakiyama, et al.,2017).   
In addition, Big hover or big brother? public attitudes about drone usage in 
domestic policing activities (Sakiyama, M., Miethe, T. D., Lieberman, J. D., Heen, M. S. 
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J., & Tuttle, O. 2017) also researched the relationship between police use of drones as an 
aid with community policing, which similarly found through a national survey that there 
were privacy and surveillance concerns based on several socio-economic characteristics 
on whether they accepted drone use, except for search and rescue and  border patrol 
operations (Sakiyama, et al,. 2017). Police UAV use: Institutional realities and public 
perceptions examined the relationship of police use of drones and people’s perceptions 
which could lead to misconceptions and concerns specifically in Canada (Saulnier, et al., 
2016). 
Big data from the sky: Popular perceptions of private drones in Switzerland 
explored the attitude of the people in Switzerland about drones used only for private 
citizens and organizations used for recreational and commercial purposes in order to 
determine their understandings, fears, hopes, and expectations (Klauser, F., & Pedrozo, S. 
2017). My dissertation advanced the literature twofold: first, I provided an examination 
of two different types of individuals, those who understood research, and argued against 
drones, the targeted-elites and those who did not, the everyday citizen. This to my 
knowledge had not been done; therefore, it allowed the comparison of two types of 
people in order to determine if the same conclusions were drawn.  Second, I designed two 
types of surveys that reflected the expertise of the elites and the mass opinion. This was 
important because the open-ended survey allowed for the elites to elaborate on their 
answers in order to further examine their reasoning behind them. The survey for the mass 
opinion was established to gauge their knowledge of drones because I assumed, they 
were not the experts as well as determining where they acquired their information on 
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drones from, in addition, discovering if they could form an opinion independent of the 
bias from those media sources. My dissertation took the literature a little further because I 
compared and analyzed two groups of people in order to see if they thought the same 
when it came to drone surveillance, privacy, and targeted drone strikes. 
Implications: Public Policy 
My study contributed to learning about the targeted elites and the mass public and 
how they thought alike with respect to their attitudes towards drones could directly help 
force lawmakers to change or at least include them in public policy through transparency. 
My data showed that the targeted elites were not in favor of drone surveillance within the 
United States due to privacy concerns and the mass public saw drone surveillance as 
intrusive on privacy. The current literature seemed back the attitudes of my respondents 
with their concerns for drone surveillance within the US. For example, a study that 636 
participants nationwide discovered only 47% of participants were in favor of drone used 
for ‘detecting criminal activities’ or ‘crowd management’ which involved more proactive 
surveillance activities where police initiated actions based on their discretion (Sakiyama, 
et al., 2017). The authors found the low approval because there was no immediate victim 
that existed to justify police presence, lead to their participants concerned about being 
watched by ‘big brother’ or personal safety issues in this physical environment 
underlined this lower support for drone usage for crowd management purposes 
(Sakiyama, et al., 2017). 
In addition, a study done in Switzerland that was in direct contrast to my findings 
with the targeted elite and mass public found that most respondents were supportive of 
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the use of unarmed military and police drones (65 and 72% respectively), the approval 
numbers decreased to 23 and 32% when it came to commercial and hobby drones 
(Klauser & Pedrozo, 2017). A similar picture emerged when the privacy issue was 
brought up, while only 28 and 36% of the respondents associated privacy issues with 
military and police drones, 60 and 62% were worried about privacy in connection with 
commercial and hobby drones (Klauser & Pedrozo, 2017). My survey asked if they 
approved of civilians having drones and 58 of them disapproved while only 35 approved; 
my data results were similar with current research and where it has gone since I 
conducted my research.  Also, another study conducted about the public’s comfort with 
police surveillance showed that support fell below 50 percent when the subject dealt with 
the monitoring of protests (42 percent) and for general surveillance over public spaces 
(35 percent) (Saulnier & Thompson, 2016). The study also found a link between privacy 
concerns and comfort with police use of UAVs where 75 percent of individuals polled 
felt that law enforcement services should be required to obtain a court issued warrant 
before they use a drone, and the majority (69 percent) of respondents reported that they 
would be very concerned (49 percent) or somewhat concerned (20 percent) about their 
privacy if law enforcement adopted the use of drones  with high-tech surveillance 
cameras and recording equipment (Saulnier & Thompson, 2016).  Saulnier and 
Thompson found that the respondents’ lacked confidence in the ability of federal (47 
percent) and local (44 percent) law enforcement services to use drone technology 
“appropriately” and in accordance with governing laws and regulations (Saulnier & 
Thompson, 2016). These studies continued the belief that the public did not have the trust 
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in the government to conduct surveillance without abusing their position; therefore, a 
constant theme in the studies done after mine showed a need for the government to not 
only have some type of oversight needed in order to curb abuse and maintain some 
privacy protections. 
It would behoove policymakers (since they are in a voted position) to include the 
public on drone surveillance and private drone hobbyists on the specific rules and 
regulations governing them. Specifically, letting the public know when surveillance 
would be used, for example, large protests, natural disasters and so on.  In addition, they 
would be transparent about the technology that was available to be attached to drones. 
For example, infrared cameras that could look through walls, facial recognition, and 
recording capabilities to name a few.  The people could force policymakers to be 
transparent about any public policy involving drones for debate to be established before 
any type of drone surveillance could be utilized. 
Implications: Social Change 
My data suggested that the biggest social change implication my research showed 
was education. By that I meant people educating themselves and others on drones and 
their capabilities because the more one knows, the better prepared they are.  Drones are 
here and will continue to be used by private civilians, the government, police, and 
emergency services for the foreseeable future. It is important to be educated because 
43.3% of the Walden participant pool did not follow stories about drones. In addition, 
education can and to some degree has shined light on the potential for infringement on 
individuals’ privacy, civil, and political rights with the large-scale deployments of drones.  
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For example, many did not know the type of ability a drone has to process data (such as 
images and sound) and knowing which data processing equipment are on-board, for what 
purposes personal data are being collected and by whom (Finn & Wright, 2016).  
Furthermore, drones could possess the dexterity to have a wireless connection with other 
drones in order to create unique vantage points (Finn & Wright, 2016).  This could allow 
drones to avoid obstacles such as barriers, walls or fences, enabling them to gather wide 
varieties of information without needing a direct line of sight, for long periods of time 
and across large area without stopping (Finn & Wright, 2016).  Education will also help 
in safety, because of all the drones in the sky, which are not visible to the naked eye, 
there should be a real concern about collisions with other aircraft (Finn & Wright, 2016).  
Knowing this was impossible without educating yourself, hopefully my dissertation will 
go a long way in encouraging that. 
I plan to continue researching and educating others on the capabilities of drones 
by keeping up with these technological advancements in order to inform the public the 
possibility of the intrusiveness drones can provide on privacy. I think it’s important for 
them to be aware of the potential for eyes in the sky. Due my research, I educated myself 
on drones to the point where I found about drone races and drone conferences. I cannot 
think of a better way for people to find about drones than seeing them firsthand. I can 
assist in informing the public of these conferences for them to get a better understanding 
of what drones can do.  I intend to maintain a focus on what future rules and regulations 
the FAA plans to introduce because these recommendations will come without 
consultation with the public; therefore, it is important to me to make sure to address these 
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rules and regulations with the public in order to determine if they feel that they go far 
enough as well as being specific to protecting the public. Governmental rules and 
regulations can be difficult to sift through and understand, I plan to read these laws and 
update the public as more are created in order to get a handle of increased number of 
private drone users. In addition, I plan to also keep up and inform about the number of 
drone incidents that occur, because that puts public safety at risk for example, hobbyists 
flying their drone too close to airports. 
The number of drones is not only increasing with private citizens, law 
enforcement has also increased its drone fleet.  For instance, according to the Center for 
the Study of the Drone at Bard College between 2009 and 2015, at least 148 agencies 
appeared to have started a drone program. In 2016, 258 agencies appeared to have started 
a drone program and in 2017, 334 agencies and in 2018 120 agencies (Center for the 
Study of the Drone, 2018). I think it is important to keep the public aware because I am 
sure they do not know just what agencies use drones and for what purpose. I will 
continue to push for more public debate on drones. 
Limitations 
Walden Participant Pool 
Surveys could be a way for the public to make their opinion known; however, a 
survey could also pose major challenges for researchers like me using them in their work. 
As evidenced from my survey experiments accumulated, one issue that arose was the fact 
that surveys usually proceeded issue-by-issue and rarely addressed issue characteristics 
(Guisinger& Saunders, 2017).  In addition, surveys may result in bad timing, for 
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example, some issues may be more politically polarized at the time of a survey, while 
others may simply have received less attention (Guisinger& Saunders, 2017).  Also, it 
was difficult to determine if and when an attitude on a particular issue was formed, thus 
the researcher did not know if that feeling was predetermined or not (Guisinger& 
Saunders, 2017).  I used a Likert scale survey for the mass opinion on drones. 
Unfortunately, this provided weaknesses for my research. First, the attitude of the 
participant. For example, the participant may have changed his or her feelings about 
drone while taking the survey which may have provided a less than accurate account of 
how they felt. Second, their attention span. The survey was 32 questions in length, but 
they may have lost focus and just started answering questions without reading them 
properly in order to finish. In addition, the potential was there for respondents to skip 
answers, which happened a lot in my demographics questioning. Third, the wording of 
the questioning could be a weakness because they may not best describe the attitude of 
the participant (Copeland, 2017).  For example, the way the question was posed may 
prove some confusion, then that leads them to picking an appropriate response. Very 
concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not concerned at all 
There were four possible responses here, but if the participant did not see a 
response that did not pertain to how he or she felt at the moment then the answer would 
then be inaccurate, or the question skipped altogether. Lastly, drones are a serious issue, 
especially when it comes to privacy and safety; therefore, by using Likert-scale 




My goal was to get the targeted elites to expand on their answers with open ended 
questions because they were the experts in the field. However, I did not get much 
explanation beyond a sentence or two. This was disappointing because I needed more 
information elaborating on their opinion in order to provide more data on how my 
targeted elites opinion shaped their responses. In addition, with open-ended questions a 
greater amount of response time, thought, and effort was necessary which meant their 
answers could take more time (Copeland, 2017). Maybe that was why they did not 
respond the way I needed them too and that was my data’s downfall, but that lack of 
responses hurt my research.  The second weakness was trying to acquire the elites 
themselves. The elites consisted of scholars who wrote peer-reviewed articles on drones, 
people from the ACLU, DoD, DOJ, Legislative Attorneys, RAND Corporation, and the 
FAA (Appendix C). There were 44 names targeted, however, I was only able to garner 
five responses. My disappointment in the lack of responses was a setback for my research 
and data because I did not have anywhere near enough participants to offset the 108, I 
garnered in the Walden Participant Pool. Therefore, the comparisons could not happen on 
the scale that I was hoping for, but I had to use the responses that I received. 
Conclusions 
Drone technology develops so quickly that it rends much of the literature quickly 
out of date, including this one. Table 29 showed the potential for governmental abuse of 
drone use within the United States and 84 of the 108 participants were either very or 
somewhat concerned. These results suggested the importance of continuing to acquire 
public perceptions of drones and drone surveillance with respect to privacy because 
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public opinion has the power to persuade and send lingering messages for public policy 
within the US with respect to its pursuits of future drone applications. In addition, the 
data also emphasized the importance of communication and transparency about the 
government’s use of drone as well as the technology that was available with these drones 
for the government to show the potential benefits of drones. If future literature continued 
to address these issues, then the support for drones could increase just if the people were 
kept informed as well as being able to add their input into decisions around how drones 
are used. 
Descriptive results from my data suggested that the mass opinion and the targeted 
elites are closely aligned when it came to drone surveillance invading privacy, as well as 
concern for governmental abuse. The practical implications suggested that no matter the 
level of information on drone policy both had common ground, this could lead to positive 
social change by helping the government gauge the potential impact of drones on society 
prior to their widespread adoption. Such data could be used by policymakers to generate 
rules that properly balance the technological value of drones in society with those moral 
values and constitutional rights that made our democratic society possible. Additionally, 
drones could be affected by social change, which coincided with public policy in that 
public acceptance was an important key factor in alleviating the publics fears and 
showing the benefits of drone adaptation. 
This gave the policy makers the opportunity to take advantage of where they 
could improve the perceptions of drones by informing them on the possibilities of the 
good drones could do with emergency response in natural disasters by searching for 
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survivors for example.  In addition, the government could also use surveys like mine to 
gauge what type of safety, security and privacy safeguards they wanted to see in place to 
prevent citizens and government overreach. RQ1 asked what level of political knowledge 
regarding drone usage do policy elites and the mass public possess in the United States? 
Through my discussion on theories of media framing and salience, my survey indicated 
that the more familiar people are with the technological advancement’s drones possessed, 
along with their potential governmental, private and commercial uses they then could 
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Appendix A: Survey for Mass Opinion 






2. Who is this person and what is his political affiliation? 
 
 Mitch McConnell; Republican 
John Boenher; Republican  
Adam Schiff; Democrat 
 Charles Schumer; Democrat   




 John Boehner; Republican 
 Nancy Pelosi; Democrat 
Elizabeth Warren; Democrat 
 Kelly Ayote; Republican   
 
4. How closely have you been following news stories about the U.S. government’s use of 
drones? 
 Very closely 
Somewhat closely 
Not too closely 
Not at all 




Most days  
Once or twice a day 
 Only occasionally   
6. How often do you get your news from the print media?  
 Everyday 
Most days 
Once or twice a day 
Only occasionally 
7. How often do you get your news from the internet?  
 Everyday 
Most days 
Once or twice a day 
 Only occasionally 
 




9. How influential do you think the media is at shaping your opinion on important issues? 
120 
 
 Very influential 
Somewhat influential 
Not influential at all 
10. Some people in the media think that domestic drone surveillance violates privacy and 




11. Some people in the media think that domestic drone surveillance is necessary to 




12. What is your overall perception of drones?  
 Favorable 
Somewhat favorable 
Not favorable at all 
13. How many times have you read an article or watched a news story involving drones 







14. How would you personally rank the importance of drone surveillance in the US?  
 High 
In the middle 
Low 
 Not at all 
 
15. How concerned are you that drone strikes endanger civilian lives? 
 Very concerned 
Somewhat concerned 
Not too concerned 
Not concerned at all 




17. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using drones to kill a U.S. citizen 






18. Do you think it is constitutional or unconstitutional for the president of the United 




19. How concerned are you that drone strikes will lead to retaliatory terrorist attacks? 
 Very concerned 
Somewhat concerned 
Not too concerned 
Not concerned at all 
20. How effective do you think surveillance drones over US airspace will protect its 
citizens from crime? 
 Very effective 
Effective 
Somewhat effective 
Not effective at all 
21. How effective do you think surveillance drones over US airspace will protect its 





Not effective at all 
22. Do you think Americans will have to give up some of their personal freedoms in 




23. How concerned are you that drone surveillance will be too intrusive on your privacy? 
 Very concerned 
Somewhat concerned 
Not too concerned 
Not concerned at all 
24. When it comes to drone surveillance within the US, how concerned are you that the 
government may abuse its power? 
 Very concerned  
Somewhat concerned 
Not too concerned 
Not concerned at all 






26. So far, 15 states have implemented rules and regulations for domestic drones prior to 
the federal government. Do you think this type of proactive governing will help protect 













Prefer not to answer 





Prefer not to answer 




















Prefer not to answer 











Appendix B: Survey for Targeted Elites. 
1. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using drones to kill terrorists? Why 
or why not? 
 
2. Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using drones to kill a U.S. citizen 
without due process? Why or why not? 
 
3. Do you think it is constitutional or unconstitutional for the president of the United 
States to order the killing of American citizens who are suspected of being terrorists? 
Why or why not? 
 
4. How do you personally feel about domestic drone surveillance? 
 
5. Do you think the media is objective when reporting on domestic drone surveillance? 
Why or 




6. So far, 15 states have implemented rules and regulations for domestic drones prior to 
the federal government. Do you think this type of proactive governing will help protect 
citizens’ civil rights? Why or why not?   
 
 
7. How concerned are you that drone strikes will lead to retaliatory terrorist attacks? 
 Very concerned 
A little concerned 
Somewhat concerned 
Not too concerned 
Not concerned at all 
8. Do you think surveillance drones over US airspace will effectively protect its citizens 
from crime and terrorism? Why or why not? 
 
9. Do you think Americans will have to give up some of their personal freedoms in order 






10. How concerned are you that drone surveillance will be too intrusive on your privacy? 
 Very concerned 
Somewhat concerned 
Not too concerned 
Not concerned at all 
9. When it comes to drone surveillance within the US, how concerned are you that the 
government may abuse its power? 
 Very Concerned 
Somewhat concerned 
Not too concerned 
Not concerned at all 






12. How important is the issue of drone surveillance to you? 
 Very important 
Somewhat important  
Not too important  
Not important at all 
 
13. What is your gender? 
 Female 
Male 
Prefer not to answer 
14. What is your age? 
 18 to 24 
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25 to 34 
35 to 44 
45 to 54 
55 to 64 
65 to 74 
75 or older 





Prefer not to answer 













Prefer not to answer 
18. What is the highest level of education you completed? 






























Appendix C: Targeted Elites 
Scholars ACLU DOJ DOD 
    
Bergen, Peter Jaffer, Jameel Thompson, Karl Weatherington, 
Dyke  
Hafez, Mohammed M. Manes, Jonathan   
Hatfield, Joseph M. Spitzer, Arthur B.   
Jaeger, David A.  Wizner, Ben   
Johnston, Patrick   Crump, Catherine    
Jordan, Jenna Stanley, Jay   
 Mannes, Aaron    
Price, Bryan    
Sarbahi, Anoop    
Siddique, Zahra    
 Smith, Megan 
Tiedemann, Kathleen  
Walsh, Joseph I.  
Wilner, Alex   
   







Legislative Attorneys RAND 
Corporation 
FAA  
    
Dolan, Alissa Lingel, Sherrill                Bolton, Edward  
Thompson II, R.M. Menthe, Lance                                                                 Shellabarger, Nan  
 Alkire, Brien                                                                    Swayze, Rich  
 Gibson, John                                                                      
 Grossman, Scott 
A.                                                          
  
 Guffey, Robert A.                                                        
 Henry, Keith                                                                       











Davis, Lynn E 
  
 Wu, Edward 
Nacouzi, George                                               
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Note: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association as well as Common Unmanned Aircraft Systems Joint 

























Appendix D: Permission to Conduct Research Using SurveyMonkey.com 
SurveyMonkey Inc.  
                                                                                                                                                        
www.surveymonkey.com  
                                                                                                                                                        
For questions, visit our Help                                






To whom it may concern:  
 
This letter is being produced in response to a request by a student at your institution who 
wishes to conduct a survey using SurveyMonkey in order to support their research. The 
student has indicated that they require a letter from SurveyMonkey granting them 
permission to do this. Please accept this letter as evidence of such permission. Students 
are permitted to conduct research via the  
SurveyMonkey platform provided that they abide by our Terms of Use, a copy of 
which is available on our website. SurveyMonkey is a self-serve survey platform on 
which our users can, by themselves, create, deploy and analyze surveys through an online 
interface. We have users in many different industries who use surveys for many different 
purposes. One of our most common use cases is students and other types of researchers 
using our online tools to conduct academic research.  
If you have any questions about this letter, please contact us through our Help 





Appendix E: Pre-Contact Notification (targeted elites) 
Date 
 
Dear Prospective Participant, 
My name is Kevin Leonard and I am a graduate student at Walden University. For 
my dissertation, I am examining United States drone policy overseas, as well as the 
potential use for drone surveillance within the United States, in order to determine your 
opinion on the potential impacts of adopting these surveillance techniques over US soil 
has on civil liberties and its effectiveness as a means to protect this county from crime 
and terrorism. I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing my 
survey.  
You will be receiving an email in the coming days that will provide more detail 
about the survey itself, which will include a link to where you can access my survey.  The 
questionnaire will require approximately 20 minutes of your time to complete. There will 
be no compensation for responding to my survey nor is there any known risk. You name 
will be kept confidential throughout the entire process. I hope you will choose to 








Appendix F: Invitation E-mail (Targeted Elites) 
Date 
Dear Prospective Participant, 
My name is Kevin Leonard and I am a graduate student at Walden University. I 
sent you a pre-contact notification about my dissertation, which examines United States 
drone policy overseas, as well as the potential use for drone surveillance within the 
United States, in order to determine your opinion on the potential impacts of adopting 
these surveillance techniques over US soil has on civil liberties. In addition, the 
effectiveness of surveillance drones as a means to protect this county from crime and 
terrorism. I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing my survey.  
The following questionnaire will require approximately 20 minutes to complete 
and can be accessed by the link below. There is no compensation for responding nor is 
there any known risk. In order to ensure that all information will remain confidential, I 
will not include your name, I will just generically describe your position. For example, a 
scholar who wrote articles concerning US drone policy. My committee chair Dr. Ozymy 
and my other committee member Dr. Lum will have access to my data. If you choose to 
participate in this project, please answer all questions as honestly as possible at the link 
provided. Again, your identity is confidential and will be protected at all times. 
Participation in this study is on a voluntary basis and you may refuse to participate at any 
time. Thank you for taking the time to assist me in pursuing my dissertation. The data 
collected will provide useful information regarding your input on drones and how you 
140 
 
think they will affect this country’s abilities to protect civil liberties, in which I will then 
compare them to mass public opinion who may not be as knowledgeable on the subject as 
you are. In addition, if you would like a summary of this study please let me know in the 
space provided on the consent letter.  If you require additional information or have 
questions, please contact me at the number listed below. 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant that you want to 
discuss privately, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University 
representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. 
Walden University’s approval number for this study is 04-14-15-0303561 and it expires 
on April 13, 2016. 
Sincerely, 
                                                                                  SURVEY LINK 
Kevin Leonard 
Committee Chair 











Appendix G: Follow-up (Targeted Elites) 
Date: 
 
Dear Prospective Participant, 
 
My name is Kevin Leonard, a graduate student at Walden University conducting a 
survey on US drone policy overseas and within this country.  I sent you an invitation 
letter asking for your participation in my survey and the survey itself.  If you have 
completed the survey already when you received this follow-up, please accept my sincere 
thanks and ignore this email. However, if you have not completed the survey, please do 
so in order to help me complete my research project with the link provided below. I 
greatly appreciate your participation. If you have any questions at all, please feel free to 
call me at 785-226-1674 or email at kevin.leonard@waldenu.edu. Your opinion on 
drones is extremely valuable to me gaining insight on how you view this issue, as well as 
helping me fulfill my educational endeavors. Thanks again for your help. 
 
                                                                                                SURVEY LINK 
Sincerely, 
Kevin Leonard 
 
